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Master Thesis
Identity and Security in Europe: A Constructivist Study of Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and Lithuania

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Abstract
This study examines different national constructions of contemporary European identities. The assumption is made that the construction of states' identities and identification of threats is a mutual process. For this reason special attention is paid to the construction of threats, embedded in a specific structure of the securitisation process. The author tries to answer to the questions of how identities are reproduced through the discourse on security and what information the analysis of national identities' constructions of Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and Lithuania can provide about the contemporary ideas of a collective European identity using combination of Alexander Wendt's theoretical framework for analysing states' identities and the Copenhagen school's securitisation approach.

Keyword
identity, security, constructivism, securitisation
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SUMMARY

This study examines different national constructions of the contemporary European identity. The purpose of this study is to investigate contemporary ideas of European identity through analysing the production of states’ identities. The assumption is made that the construction of states’ identities and identification of threats is a mutual process. For this reason special attention is paid to the construction of threats, embedded in a specific logical structure of the securitisation process. The central question is how identities are reproduced through the discourse on security. Furthermore, the question of what information the analysis of national identities’ constructions can provide about the contemporary ideas of a collective European identity is of particular interest. Four countries – Germany, Britain, Sweden and Lithuania – are in empirical focus of analysis, mainly because of these countries’ special positions in the contemporary European order constellation.

The study is guided by the constructivist approach in International Relations, where particular attention is given to Alexander Wendt’s theoretical framework for analysing states’ identities in the international system. Besides, the Copenhagen school’s securitisation approach serves as an analytical framework, and discourse analysis, understood in this school’s terms, is employed in the study. Working in such a theoretical framework, the author presents and analyses the securitising actors’ constructions/reconstructions of identities in the European context.

The main conclusion of this study implies that there exist different narratives of national identities and because of these differences diverse discursive strategies are employed in the securitisation process. On the other hand, there are some similarities in the actors’ constructions, which may serve as a common ground for a collective European identity formation. It seems that an ongoing socialisation process at the European level influences national identities’ constructions and creates positive identifications of each other. However, this convergence should not be exaggerated. There is still a considerable difference in how the securitising actors ‘tell a story’ of identity, which influences the understanding of a collective European identity and thefinality of the European integration project.
Identity and security in the 1990s have become the major issues in the European research agenda. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have opened up for possibilities to redefine Europe and European order. Furthermore, the deeper integration process within the European Union (EU) has escalated the question of the future of Europe. At the same time questions of what Europe is, where Europe is going, if there is a coherent collective European identity and other questions related to identities in Europe and European identity have been preoccupying many International Relations (IR) scholars. As Behnke (2000) suggests, the issues of IR scholars’ interest in European identities can be divided in three main categories. To the first category belong studies that are evolving around the issue of collective European identity *vice-versus* nation-states identities. The second category of researches addresses the question of European boundaries, i.e. which countries belong/are to belong to Europe and which are/will be outside. Finally, the third group of scholars has been studying the relationships between different constructions of national identities, attempting to identify the enemies and adversaries, interests and discourses of states (Behnke 2000). Hence, it is obvious that the question of Europe’s future and European order is a complex one, involving many layers and diverse factors.

In addition, the debates on Europe’s future and a collective European identity often involve a security dimension. To be more precise, identity and security has been increasingly interwoven in the studies of European identities. As many IR scholars argue, identity and security are intimately related concepts (Buzan 1991; Lipschutz 1995; Hyde-Price 2000; Buzan *et al* 1998; McSweeney 1999). Identity is understood as a particular narrative, an ongoing process, within which actors continuously produce and reproduce conceptions of threats. The construction of threats involves an identification of ‘Other’ and ‘self’ against which the understanding of security is being articulated and identity is being reproduced.

After the end of the Cold War European states find themselves in a process of maintaining or reconstructing national identity and reconsidering security concerns under the influence of the

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**CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION**

In the West and the East, at the centre and the periphery, cultural identity and societal security have become central themes of political attitudes and conflicts.

(Hassner, in Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2000:1).
European integration and cooperation issues. In that sense, the new European order is developing in the intersection among European states’ understanding of security threats, incorporation/non-incorporation of ‘Europe’ in their national identity understanding and visions of European integration.

Hence, if one wants to study contemporary ideas of Europe and Europe’s future it is possible to study threats that states identify and, as a result, to identify the process of identity construction or reconstruction. In this context it is also possible to analyse how Europe is being constructed – on the basis of inherent values or by contrast to some external ‘Other’. Here the identification of threats becomes of particular importance. At the same time questions of the existence of a collective European identity, the role of such identity and future perspectives of Europe can be addressed as well.

Thus, the purpose of this study is to investigate contemporary ideas of European identity through an analysis of the discourse on security developed by key officials of four European states.

1.1. Research questions

The main questions of this study are:

-How are states’ identities constructed and reinforced through the discourse on security?
-What do the analysis of construction/reconstruction of states’ identities say about the formation of a collective European identity?

In order to answer these general questions, the following questions provide the main line for the study:

-What threats do securitising actors identify and for whom?
-How are issues framed by securitising actors and why?
-Which identities’ constellations are emerging and how can they be interpreted?

To study the above in a constructive and fruitful way, four countries have been chosen for the analysis, mainly because of their particular position in the contemporary European order constellation. The first country is Germany, one of the major powers in the European integration project, backed up by its economic power and large population as well as considered to be one of the engines for European integration. To get a converse perspective
Britain represents the second country in the analysis. Britain sees the EU in more instrumental way, as a necessary condition for Britain being leading and influential power in Europe. The country still puts a lot of emphasis on the transatlantic relationship, strongly advocating for maintenance of strong and close relations with the US. The third country is Sweden, which represents the tradition of neutrality and is a relatively new member of the EU. Finally, the last country is Lithuania, an accession candidate to the EU with a historically problematic security position. Hence, it is expected that the analysis of the construction of these countries’ identities will give insights into the contemporary ideas of European identity and the future of European order.

1.2. Limitation of the study

As the purpose of this study is to analyse the current ideas of European identities, the period of 1998–2002 was chosen for analysis. This study focuses on the European dimension and leaves NATO and the transatlantic relationship outside the scope of analysis. Furthermore, the issue of Iraq crisis was also left outside the scope of analysis due to the complexity and exceptionality of the issue.

1.3. Methodology

Since this study emphasises words and discourse rather than quantification of data, it involves qualitative comparative analysis. Qualitative analysis gives a researcher an interpretative and constructionist framework (Bryman 2001) necessary for studying the construction and reproduction of identities through a process of securitisation.

Security is understood as an intersubjective and socially constructed practice. The intersubjective angle provides a possibility to study ideas and visions, opening a space for actors’ understandings of security. Thus, the emphasis of this study is the security discourse that helps actors to make sense of and construct the world.

The method of the study is discourse analysis. Since the study is guided by the Copenhagen school’s securitisation approach, discourse is understood in this school’s terms. In the Copenhagen school’s account language is understood as being more than only description, because social practices can be understood only through language. Language is a specific system of meanings, which can be studied with the help of discourse analysis. Discourse
limits possible statements about social life and its practices, constraining what is possible to say and what is not. Furthermore, discursive practices limit the ways of possible statements of social practices, so constraining actors’ action and establishing power relationship. The actors are bargaining and struggling for the possibility to socially construct an issue in their own way. Besides, discourse is never fully closed, which means that there always is a possibility for change.

The main weakness of discourse analysis as well as of other qualitative research methods is the issue of reliability and validity. Since discourse analysis is working in ‘understand’ rather than ‘explain’ dimension and involves interpretation of the data, the method obtains a greater degree of subjectivity. This problem can be solved following Milliken’s (1999) suggestions. According to Milliken, reliability of discourse analysis can be achieved if the interpretations are checked and reworked until attained categories can be applicable to the texts that originally were outside the scope of analysis. Furthermore, the interpretation of the researcher should be compared to other studies of the same issue and ‘discuss her findings with others who know the empirical materials with which she was working’ (Milliken 1999:235).

Another common critique of discourse analysis is that it is idealist. However, it should be noticed that discourse analysis works on public sources and analyse them as they are, not as indications of something else. Thus, discourse analysis does not try to get perceptions or thoughts of the actors, but provides a possibility to look at the way of how a specific discourse is produced (Sayyid and Zac 1998). In this way it is not claimed that language creates reality, but rather that ‘reality is only accessible through the descriptions made in language’ (Sayyid and Zac 1998:254). Despite the heavy critique from the positivist side discourse analysis is being increasingly used in International Relations and provides valuable insights into International Relations phenomena.

Following Jupp's suggestion that discourse can be expressed in text through the medium of documents (Jupp 1996:300), the data for analysis comes from the speeches of the principal government actors. As it was mentioned, the period of 1998-2002 was chosen for analysis. The number of speeches varies depending on availability, but at least 5 speeches per year have been analysed. 52 speeches of Germany’s government actors have been analysed, 49 speeches of British, 53 speeches of Sweden’s and 49 speeches of Lithuania’s government actors, which totally corresponds to 203 speeches\(^1\). The number and type of chosen actors

\(^1\) For a full list of material see appendix p.80.
vary according to each country’s political system. An effort was made to select only those speeches that embraced a European dimension, that is, speeches, concerning Iraq, NATO and the transatlantic relationship in the most of the cases were left aside. Of course, some general points have been made anyway, because the issues are interweaved and it is impossible to strictly divide them. In order to minimise potential biases, the author of the paper relied on speeches in English unless due to the lack of material it was necessary to take speeches in the native languages as well. The results may have some degree of bias due to the necessary translations from the native to English language and the Lithuanian origin of the author.

The official speeches as a material for an analysis were chosen for the following reasons. First, according to Le Pestre (1997), official speeches seek to persuade audience, to reinforce particular constructions of social issues and for this reason it is an appropriate material for discourse analysis.

Furthermore, as states Aggestam (2000), key foreign policy speeches ten to 'contain the subjective we feelings of cultural groups that are related to specific customs, institutions, territory, myths, or rituals' (Aggestam 2000:90). Thus, analysis of official speeches can give important insights into construction and reinforcement of national identity, the view of how history is understood and which future prospects are supported.

The focus on official speeches is by some authors criticised as being biased, i.e. that speeches are not written by the speaker. However, even if it is so, it is most often at least revisited by the speaker, as Le Pestre argues. Speech-writers serve more as technical assistants, because they can better express ideas that the speaker wants to pass on to his/her audience and by that does not influence the contents of speeches (Le Pestre 1997).

1.4. The structure of the paper

The paper is organised in the following way: chapter II discusses theoretical framework of the study. First, the conventional IR theories are addressed with an emphasis on their understanding of security. Then the Copenhagen school’s approach on securitisation is outlined and finally, Wendt’s social theory of international relations is discussed. Empirical analysis is performed in Chapter III. Here the constructions of national identities through the process of securitisation of every country is analysed in the separate sections. The last section of the Chapter III deals with the comparison of these different constructions. Chapter IV pulls
together the results of the analysis and discuss them in the context of European identity formation. Finally, the paper ends with Chapter V, in which the main conclusions of the paper are outlined.
CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Security in IR Theory

Theories provided by realists/neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists had been questioned already before the end of the Cold War, but the end of the Cold War accelerated the revival of alternative approaches. It was argued that state-centric and structural realist theory was not an adequate mechanism for explaining international politics and the holistic and more ideational approaches about international politics were called for (Terriff et al 1999).

The disappearance of the Cold War bipolarity raised new debates about the concept of security as well. The traditional conception of security has been challenged like never before. The collapse of bipolar division between communism and capitalism, the United States and the Soviet Union has speeded up developments of new themes and approaches that increasingly questioned the legitimacy and dominance of realism/neo-realism in security studies. It has been argued that state-centrism and preoccupation with sovereignty does not cover all the spectrum of issues and that a broader definition of security is necessary for future studies.

Since realists and neorealists have provided the dominant theoretical approach in IR, much of the debate has been constructed in terms of criticising realism. So, the discussion of realists/neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists approach in IR and their understanding of security are discussed in the paper.

2.2. Conventional Approaches to Security in IR

2.2.1. Realist/neorealist approach to security

Since the second half of the twentieth century realism/neorealism have been the dominant paradigms among IR scholars (Baldwin 1993; Buzan et al 1993; Terriff et al 1999). Classical realists such as Morgenthau, Niebuhr, Aron, Kennan, Herz and Wight produced their major

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2 However, it is necessary to notice that the end of the Cold War did not create the debate over the meaning of security. The discussions and contestation of the realist paradigm was present already before the end of the Cold War. But the end of the Cold War did accelerate those debates and different perspectives have been more widely accepted in the 1990s (Terriff et al 1999:4).

3 Although realism and neorealism are not identical, this paper does not distinguish between the two, because both perspectives have common assumptions about the world (Grieco 1993) and consider security as their primary concern (Terriff 1999).
works after World War II. The unifying feature of these writers was their wish to look at the world as it is, that is to be ‘realists’. During the 1970s realist theory was increasingly criticised, arguing that its theoretical foundations has inadequate scientific ground. As a response, Kenneth N. Waltz (1979) provided a structuralist account for the study of international relations, attempting to ‘place realism on a secure scientific footing’ (Buzan et al 1993:1). Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* defines a neorealist agenda and has dominated IR agenda until the present day.

Waltz focuses on the international system level, aiming to give structural explanation to the international system and the constraints that it imposes on state behaviour. Waltz is particularly interested in the imperatives of the international system and the distribution of capabilities within it (Waltz 1979:100-1). One of the key assumption of neorealism is that the most important actors in world politics are states, whose ‘interactions form the structure of international-political systems’ (Waltz 1979:95).

According to Waltz, the international system is anarchic. Anarchy in discussion of the international system means that there is ‘no overriding authority or government to discipline the interaction of its constituent parts’ (Mearsheimer 1994/95:10). This suggests that the international system has no governing system with enforcement power to regulate the behaviour of states. Since there is no authority with the power of enforcement, there is no reliable process to solve conflicting interests of states. In the anarchic international system states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. States always feel unsafe and are aware that other states can have offensive intentions towards them and can use their force at any time. As a consequence, if states are to be secure, they must be constantly ready to care for themselves.

Furthermore, none of the states can count on being protected by another state and can rely only on their own efforts to keep safe, engaging in what Waltz define as a ‘self-help’ system (Waltz 1979). In such situation the state’s capabilities of using force become crucial to the state’s pursuit of interests and ability to influence other states’ actions. According to Waltz, capabilities in the international system are relative as states are positioned with respect to each other by their power. They are distributed unevenly within the system and because of that states with relatively more power than others can influence the outcome of the interaction with other states. Since power is relative, states are preoccupied with the accumulation of power, especially with the capacity to use force in order to raise their power (Waltz 1979).
In realist/neorealist perspective security is placed at the heart of IR (Terriff et al. 1999:10). Since the international system is anarchic and conflictual, states are insecure and are concerned about maintaining their power. Above all, states are motivated by a desire for survival, or, in other words, by the protection of their sovereignty: ‘survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have’ (Waltz 1979:91). Survival is the ultimate goal, because ‘only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit and power’ (Waltz 1979:126). Survival means the state’s capacity to protect its territorial boundaries and its sovereign ability to act freely. This preoccupation with survival conditions states’ behaviour. Power and insecurity dominates their relations and, as a result, security is constant preoccupation of states.

In the realist/neorealist view, threat comes from the interaction of states within an anarchic system. The degree of the threat depends on state’s capabilities, and especially military capabilities since the central threat to state’s survival is possible or actual use of force. So, if state has more power than other states, it can influence the outcome of interaction and guarantee its survival in an anarchic world. This logic makes states both ‘offensively-oriented and defensively-oriented’ (Mearsheimer 1994/95:12). This means that states want to increase their military capabilities, so that other states could not threaten its survival. But at the same time, states also want to take advantage of one another. Hence, the anarchic structure of the international system forces states to strive for security, which results in constant security competition and endless power struggle.

2.2.2. Neoliberal institutionalism and security

The first of the major challengers to realism/neorealism has been neoliberal institutionalism. This perspective developed from theories of interdependence and international regimes, achieving a coherent body of theory in the mid-1980s (Terriff et al. 1999:48). Neoliberal institutionalists were not satisfied with the traditional realist/neorealist thinking about international politics and attempted to reformulate Waltz’s approach. Neoliberal institutionalists share a rationalist approach with realists/neorealists. They accept realist assumption that states are the main actors in world politics and that they are self-interested and insecure. Neoliberal institutionalism also accepts realists’ assumption of anarchy in the international system and the centrality of power in international relations. Yet neoliberal
institutionalists disagree with realist’s account on international cooperation, the role of international institutions and the importance of relative versus absolute gains (Caporaso 1992; Keohane 1993; Baldwin 1993).

As Robert Powell notices, neoliberal institutionalists assume that ‘states focus primarily on their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains of others. Whether cooperation results in a relative gain or loss is not very important to a state in neoliberal institutionalism so long as it brings an absolute gain’\(^4\) (Powell 1993:209). In contrast, realists/neorealists argue that states are more interested in relative gains, because of the anarchic structure of the international system (Grieco 1993). These different assumptions about states’ preferences lead to different expectations on the possibility for international conflict and cooperation. The more states care about relative gains, the more difficult will cooperation be (Powell 1993).

The major concern for neoliberal institutionalism is ‘how institutions affect incentives facing states’ (Keohane and Nye 1989:11). Neoliberal institutionalists argue that international institutions do matter and can have a significant role in world politics (Keohane and Nye 1989). Whereas realists are sceptical to cooperation among states in the international system because it can be dangerous for state’s survival, neoliberal institutionalists argue that institutions can change state concerns about relative gains in cooperation. This is possible because of some factors.

First, international institutions can provide information, which means that it becomes easier to know what other states are doing and possibility of cooperation may significantly increase (Keohane and Martin 1995). Second, international institutions create rules, which tend to increase the number of transactions (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Lipson 1984). For this reason it pays better not to cheat, because if caught, state can be excluded from future cooperation, losing more than gaining. Third, institutions can reduce costs, so that profitability increases and transaction costs reduce (Keohane 1984:89-92). Finally, rules can increase interdependence in the way that they can link together interactions between states in different issue areas (Martin 1992).

However, realists/neorealists do not believe in such possibilities. They agree that institutions can have an impact in economic sphere but seriously doubt the ability of such influence in the

\(^4\) That states are interested in relative gains means that states calculate their interests and gains in terms of their power relative to others in the international system. Focusing on absolute gains means that states want to avoid shared harm and, thus, mutual gains can be produced for all states in the international system (Jervis 1999).
realm of security. Grieco (1993) argue that international anarchy forces states to be preoccupied with relative power, security, and survival and, thus, cooperation is very unlikely. Mearsheimer (1994/95) support this view stating that if states want to cooperate they have to overcome concern about cheating. This is not very likely as it pays to cheat in the anarchic international system (Mearsheimer 1994/95).

Nevertheless, the differences between realists/neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists should not be overemphasised. Both conceptions are close to each other; they are two forms of the same worldview, rather than alternative perspectives (Booth and Smith 1995). Realists/neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists agree that the international system is anarchic and because of that cooperation between states is difficult. The difference is that neoliberal institutionalists believe that institutions can facilitate the constraints imposed by the anarchic international system of states and can ease cooperation.

Since both perspectives share the core assumptions about the international system, security is their primary concern (Terriff et al 1999). Realism/neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism see the state as an actor that has to be secured, focusing on the issues of military capabilities, force and competition. Both perspectives oppose broadening the notion of security (Terriff et al 1999), arguing that broadened security notion would lose its analytical utility.

The dissatisfaction with the narrow security understanding came well before the 1990s, bringing in economic and environmental dimensions to the understanding of security (Ullmann 1983; Westing 1986; Mathews 1989). One of the most important perspectives, criticising narrow and military-focused realist/neorealist approach, has been the Copenhagen school’s account on security that is addressed in the following section.
2.3. The Copenhagen School’s Approach to Security

The Copenhagen school has developed around the works of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, where the initial project was directed at providing the concept of security with a ‘more coherent theoretical basis’ (Hyde-Price 2000:28). The Copenhagen school’s perspective on security has introduced some important changes in the conventional understanding of security.

First of all, the Copenhagen school’s accounts on security and securitisation approach provide a middle ground between narrow and military concerned neorealists’ position and reflectivist critical security studies. This approach shares some theoretical burdens with critical security studies\(^5\), but it focuses on collectivities and continuing social practice instead of critical security studies concern with individuals and deconstruction (Buzan et al 1998). Contrary to neorealists state-centric position, the Copenhagen school’s researchers argue for an expanded agenda, where state ‘still might be the most important, but not the only actor in the international system’ (Buzan et al 1998:37). The second reason, logically coming from the first one, is that the Copenhagen school widens and deepens security agenda (not only state, not only military concerns), but leaves its intellectual core coherent and valid (existential threats, survival). Finally, the securitisation approach opens a possibility for analyst not to combine the roles of analyst and securitising actor, in specific way of analysis, where one studies not a ‘real’ security issue, but practices of securitisation (Waever 2000).

The Copenhagen school perceives security as an inter-subjective phenomenon, as a social construct, with the emphasis on meaning dimension in the understanding of security and the historical context in which the process takes place (Waever 1995; 1996; Buzan et al 1998; Waever 2000). A very important assumption is that the concept of security is not empty. ‘Security’ in international relations has different connotations than the everyday meaning of security (Waever 1995). ‘Security’ in everyday language means to be safe and not threatened. Quite different from this meaning, security concept in IR has its roots ‘in the traditions of power politics’ (Buzan et al 1998:21). This means that in addressing an issue in security terms, an assumption that something is related to threat and defence is automatically made (Buzan et al 1998:21). This is one of the reasons why reconceptualisation of the concept has been a difficult task and widened agenda of security studies has not been easily accepted and

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\(^5\) Some important representatives of critical security studies are Ken Booth, Keith Krause, Michael C. Williams, R.B.J. Walker and others.
still meets resistance.

It is important to note that security and politics are very close related to each other. As Waever aptly notices, a political element is always present in security realm as it is always a collective decision whether considering something as ‘security’ issue or not (Waever 2000:286). The continuing dominance of realists’ understanding of security and their unwillingness to accept broader agenda can be seen as ‘expressions of a hegemonic normative commitment to the way the world must be’ (Walker 1997:71). The security has served as an instrument for constructing political order, which, in turn, has been maintaining hegemonic policies (Dalby 1997).

As Waever argues, security is an ‘established set of practices’, it is a tradition that has been changing and evolving since World War II (Waever 1995:48-50). After World War II liberal societies were concerned about decolonising as well as coordinating and protecting global order with the Western values and Western way of living. In such an environment security became an instrument of constructing hegemony, creating strong ties among Western societies. Security was not only concerned about military threats and enemies, but it served as a way of defending common ways of life and constituting political order as well (Klein 1997:362; Dalby 1997:10). Hence, security became a field of specific practice. The term has been associated with state’s sovereignty, challenges to it and ways of trying to protect its sovereignty (Waever 1995:50). One of the most important operations that have made a field to a very specific one is securitisation. It is, in Waever’s words, ‘a construction of security as a speech act with threat-defence sequence operations that makes security into a distinct field of a social practice’ (Waever 1995:50-51). Securitisation, thus, means that an issue is framed in a specific way. The securitisation process has to involve dramatisation and presentation of an issue as having an absolute priority, using language of survival, urgency, and priority of action (Buzan et al 1998). Something is said to be an existential threat. This means that an issue gets an absolute priority and should be handled immediately, because, in opposite case, any further action would lose its meaning as there would no longer exist possibility to act independently or there would not be ‘us’ as such anymore. The construction of security as

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6Buzan et al (1998) employ language theory and state that security can be understood as a speech act. In this usage, ‘security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act; it is the primary reality’ (Waever 1995:55). By saying, says Waever, something is done, as ‘in betting, promising, naming a ship, etc.’ (Waever 1996:107). By saying ‘security’ actors can move an issue to a specific area and thereby claim the right to use extraordinary measures (Waever 1995:55). It is important to notice that the word ‘security’ does not necessarily have to be said. The most important is the specific logic, constituting the concept of security (i.e. threats, urgency and defence).
existential threats provides actors with the ability to claim a special right to use extraordinary measures and to take an issue out of the ‘normal’ political conditions. In that sense, security is a self-referential practice because ‘it is in this practice that issue becomes a security issue’ (Waever 1996:107).

However, the presentation of an issue as an existential threat by itself does not create securitisation (Buzan et al 1998). The presentation of an issue as an existential threat is called a securitising move. A securitising move indicates an attempt to securitise the issue, but acceptance from the audience has to be present in order for the issue to be securitised (Buzan et al 1998). Hence, in order for securitisation to be successful, three necessary components/steps have to be present: ‘existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules’ (Buzan et al 1998:26). This means that, to have successful securitisation, rules have to be not only broken, but the breaking of rules has to be justified by cases of existential threats.

Besides, there are facilitating conditions, influencing successfulness of securitisation. First, for an issue to be successfully securitised, it has to follow the grammar of security, i.e. be constructed in such a context that it involves existential threats, urgency, unavoidability and a possible way out. Second, if the securitising actor has an authority to do such claims, securitisation process is much more likely to succeed as audience is much more likely to accept claims from an authoritative actor. Finally, it is easier to securitise if certain objects, used in rhetoric, are generally perceived as threatening (Buzan et al 1998).

According to Buzan et al (1998), to conduct a successful analysis, a distinction among three types of units – referent objects, securitising actors and functional actors – has to be made. Referent objects are those things that are presented as being existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival. Securitising actors are those actors that securitise issues by declaring a referent object as existentially threatened. Functional actors are those actors that significantly influence decisions in the field of security (Buzan et al 1998).

The referent object can be understood as something to which securitising actor can refer to and say that it has to survive and to ensure that survival extraordinary measures should be broken

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7 This step in securisation process is the focus of the study.

8 Since this study is concerned with the first step of securitisation (securitising move), the functional actors are left outside the borders of the framework and the distinction is explained only between referent objects and securitising actors.
taken. Referent objects ‘must establish security legitimacy in terms of a claim to survival’ (Buzan et al 1998:39). In general, securitising actors have a possibility to present anything as a referent object. However, as security is an intersubjective concept, there are some types of referent objects that is much more easy to securitise, i.e. to get an acceptance from the audience. Traditionally the state has been the referent object for security and, as Waever et al showed in the book Identity, Migration and The New Security Agenda (1993), the nation in a more hidden way. With the securitisation approach Buzan et al widens the security agenda and opens it for new possible referent objects. However, the Copenhagen school’s scholars acknowledge that the state may remain the most important referent as it has historically formed privileged position and has the best structure to be referred as such, but in the securitisation approach the state is not the only referent object (Buzan et al 1998). The state most often has an established set of rules that identify those who can speak on its behalf; it is the government. So, when the government is speaking about security, it legitimately acts on behalf of the state. Thus, in the securitisation process, if the referent object is the state, it will speak for itself through ‘its authorised representatives’ (Buzan et al 1998:42). In regional constellations the state ‘occasionally securitise other referents, such as the nation, the European Union, or some principles of international society’ (Buzan et al 1998:45). In that sense, Buzan et al move from state-centric to state-dominated approach, leaving open space for other kinds of referent objects.

The securitising actor is a person or a group that makes securitisation. As explained by Buzan et al, the players in this role most often are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups (Buzan et al 1998:40). They are not referent objects, because usually there is no possibility to speak on their own behalf and in that sense, these actors refer to a larger collectivity such as a state, nation or any kind of larger community.

Buzan et al (1998) successfully solve a level-of-analysis problem, arguing that there exist strong rules, defining and limiting those who can speak on behalf of a referent object. Thus, the analysis cannot be downgraded to individuals, but rather should be focusing on ‘authoritative representatives’ (Buzan et al 1998:41). Furthermore, the best way to identify the securitising actor is to look at the speech act and see what logic (organisational or individual) it is following.

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From the above discussion follows that security is an intersubjective phenomenon; it is a constructed meaning and social practice that is constructed and reconstructed, justified and legitimised through security discourse and discursive actions. At this point it becomes clear that security cannot serve as an analytical concept, because it is actors who decide what issues are considered as security issues. Thus, as an object for an empirical study it is possible to take the definitions of security that are used by the actors (Waever 1997a). At this level, it is the actors’ concepts of security that matters. On another level, in an analysis of security issues and implications following from them, it is the analyst who interprets the concepts of security employed by the actors (Buzan et al 1998).

Thus, the task for the analyst is not to find ‘objective threats’, but to study the processes of construction of securitisation; to study this practice, trying to find answers to such questions as ‘who can ‘do’ security, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects’ (Buzan et al 1998:26); to study the specific logic of security, looking at how threats are constructed and enter into the realm and whether they are accepted by the audience or not. Therefore, the basic guideline and the point of departure is to consider survival – ‘the politics of existential threat’ -as the defining characteristic of security, thus providing the analyst with the possibility to look at distinct areas (beyond the military-political one) and still to keep the intellectual core of security studies valid (Buzan et al 1998:27). Hence, the actors have a crucial role and cannot be replaced by the analyst in the first stage of analysis in the definition of what is considered to be handled as security issue, but the following steps of analysis are decided and interpreted by the analyst (Buzan et al 1998:34).

It should be stressed that this study is concerned only with the first phase (the securitising move) of the securitisation process. This choice is made because the purpose of the study is to investigate the construction of identity through analysing identification of threats, embedded in a specific logical structure of the securitisation process. At this stage, it is the referent object and the securitising actors that matter. Besides, the focus on the securitising move phase gives insights into discursive patterns of the securitising actors and this is what the author of this study wants to analyse. It allows the researcher to reveal the logical structure of security discourse and the reaction of the audience is not needed at this stage.

Waever use ‘constructivism’ to identify his theoretical position. However, Waever emphasises that his approach cannot be understood in American mainstream constructivism, because the Copenhagen school’ approach is very much discourse-based and critical about
liberalism, while the latter approach is more sociological and ‘increasingly liberal’ (Waever 2000:287).

As it is seen from Waever’s implication, constructivism is not a coherent theoretical body. Constructivism can be said to be a common name for various, often positivistic theories opposing perspectives. Under the label of constructivism can be found various approaches, differing in their ontological or epistemological premises, such as an emancipatory constructivism, sociological constructive approaches, feminist approaches, genealogical form or ‘more strictly interpretive kind’ (Ruggie 1998:35).

To make some clarity, the next section of the paper outlines features of constructivism in IR and then discusses only conventional constructivism perspective, leaving more radical or ‘critical’ constructivism approach aside. More specifically, Alexander Wendt’s approach is of particular importance because of his attempt to provide an alternative understanding of international politics and his account on identity.

2.4. Constructivism in IR theory

2.4.1. Assumptions of constructivism

Constructivism is often described as a third way, or a ‘middle ground’ between positivism and postmodern epistemological radicalism (Adler 1997:321-3; Checkel 1998:327). This position developed as a result of IR scholars’ attempt to provide an alternative position to realism/neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism that dominated IR field and at the same time not to end up in postmodern epistemology.

After the end of the Cold War neorealism and neoliberalism ‘had almost nothing to say about the scale of change’ (Onuf 2002:129). At that time national identity started to be conceived as an important issue in IR and constructivism, with its premises about social construction of reality, could offer an explanation of the formation of identities (Onuf 2002).

As Onuf9 argues, constructivists argue that ‘ontology’10 is the key to escaping the impasse.

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9 Nicholas Onuf was the first one to introduce the term constructivism in his Worlds of Our Making (1989), but the term was popularised by Alexander Wendt in his famous article ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’ in International Organisation in 1992.

10 Italics in the original text.
between positivist complacency over epistemological matters and the wholesale postmodern dismissal of methodical pursuits’ (Onuf 2002:126). Constructivism offers a different ontology from that of positivism or idealism. This perspective understands the world as ‘becoming rather than being’ (Adler 2002:95), by that taking different position than positivism. It also assumes that language does not only represent the world as it is, but has a constitutive function as well. This means that speech are ‘the media of social construction’ (Onuf 2002:127) and material structures get their meaning only through the interpretation of social context (Checkel 1998).

On the other hand, unlike idealism, constructivism accept that the world is not only imagined, that ‘not all statements have the same epistemic value and that there is some foundation for knowledge’ (Adler 2002:95). They believe in possibility ‘of shared knowledge about the world that we live in’ (Onuf 2002:126). Thus, conventional constructivism recognise the importance of material structures but argues that these are connected with powerful social meanings.

According to Ted Hopf, ‘constructivism offers alternative understandings of a number of the central themes in international relations theory, including: the meaning of anarchy and balance of power, the relationship between state identity and interest, an elaboration of power, and the prospects for change in world politics’ (Hopf 1998:172). Besides, constructivists have their own puzzles in international relations, such as the role of identity and norms or ideas in the constitution of national interests (Adler 2002:96).

Constructivism has, using Onuf’s terminology, some ‘enduring strengths’ (2002:131), which makes it an attractive and adequate perspective in international politics’ analysis and because of these strengths it is chosen as the study’s approach. By putting more emphasis on process rather than on analysis of status quo maintenance, constructivism provides an explanation for a change in the international system (Onuf 2002). Besides, constructivism in its research strategies can employ different methodologies, providing more interpretive and insightful ways in analysing IR issues (Checkel 1998; Onuf 2002).

As it was mentioned above, there is no single constructivist approach. Hopf (1998) distinguishes between two types of constructivism: conventional and critical\textsuperscript{11}. Both

\textsuperscript{11} Some of the most prominent conventional constructivism’s figures are Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, Peter J. Katzenstein, Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Emanuel Adler, Jeffrey Checkel and Alexander Wendt. The key representatives of critical constructivism camp are Richard Ashley, David Campbell, R.B.J. Walker, and Cynthia
perspectives share the belief that social world is socially constructed and collective or intersubjective understandings play an important role in the understanding of the social world. Both perspectives agree that agents and structures are mutually constituted and both share a view of power and knowledge as meaning-producing practice (Hopf 1998:181-82).

Nevertheless, there are some areas, dividing the two perspectives. Critical constructivism is postmodern and attempt to deconstruct the power relationships of discourse, while conventional constructivism accepts the epistemology and methodology of conventional IR theories, claiming that it does not want to depart from ‘normal science’ (Hopf 1998:182). Besides, conventional constructivism and critical constructivism differ in their understanding of power. Critical constructivists ‘see power being exercised in every social exchange’ (Hopf 1998:185) and claim that scientists take an active part in the reproduction of power. In contrast, conventional constructivists remain ‘analytically neutral’ on the issue of power relations” (Hopf 1998:185). Although they agree with the idea that power is everywhere, they do not accept critical constructivists’ ideas about their ‘own role in producing change’ (Hopf 1998:185). This means that conventional constructivism separates actors and political scientists.

Critical constructivism rejects foundationalism and wish to discover the myths that are associated with identity formation. On the other hand, conventional constructivism assumes that there exist possibilities of specifying ‘a set of conditions under which one can expect to see one identity or another’ (Hopf 1998:183). Furthermore, the representatives of conventional constructivism treat identities as possible causes of action and do not explore myths formation, so departing from the critical constructivists’ position. Since the construction of identities and with them associated reproductive social practices are of particular interest for this study, the conventional constructivist perspective is considered to be the most relevant way for analysing identity. Wendt’s account on the issue is taken as a theoretical ground and for this reason his perspective is more thoroughly discussed in the following section.
2.4.2. Wendt’s social theory of international relations

Alexander Wendt is one of the few scholars attempting to provide a theoretical bridge between structural theories of international relations and nation-state identity. In his theorising, Wendt draws a lot on symbolic interactionist and structurationist sociology (Wendt 1992; 1999). Alexander Wendt takes a ‘middle ground’ position and can be called a conventional constructivist. He agrees that material structures are important but argues that only through the ideas they get social meaning.

In international relations dimension Wendt constructs his arguments in opposition to Waltz’s model. Wendt is concerned with states and the states system (Wendt 1992; 1999; 2000). He defends this view arguing that it is the states that posses a monopoly on the use of force and that the states system’s structure is relatively autonomous from other structures of the international system. Wendt argues that the very character of the international system is an outcome of the interaction among states. In his point of view, structure does not exist apart from process: ‘Self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure’ (Wendt 1992:394).

Wendt claims that conceptions of security in the anarchic international system do not necessarily have to be self-interested. According to Wendt, shared ideas make norms, institutions, or threat-systems. These shared ideas constitute the meaning of the distribution of power, ‘either by constituting states’ perceptions of that distribution or by constituting their identities and interests’ (Wendt 1999:104). According to Wendt, behaviour is based on collective meanings through which actors acquire identities, which are ‘relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self’ (Wendt 1992:397).

In his approach, the notion of identity plays a crucial role. Identity is a necessary element for an understanding of international behaviour, practices, institutions and change. It involves a complex set of issues, as it depends on self-perception and the views of other in order to secure legitimacy. Identity refers to ‘who or what actors are’ (Wendt 1999:231). Identities of states are not given, but constructed in relation to others. It is a necessity to state to become aware of what it is, to have visions, historical tasks, and traditional friendships, to defend democracy.
Wendt argues that there are two logics in identity formation: natural selection and cultural selection. Natural selection can be described as a competition or a ‘survival of the fittest’ (Wendt 1999:321). This type of identity formation is of minor interest to Wendt, because it is of marginal relevance in explaining state identities in the modern international system. The problem is that ‘natural selection operates via reproductive success’ (Wendt 1999:323) and for this type of selection to work, survival must be difficult, which for modern states is not the case (Wendt 1999:323).

Wendt's term of ‘cultural selection’ is equivalent to what sociologists call ‘socialisation’. Socialisation works through actors’ capacities for intentionality, rationality and cognition and because of that it is important in identity production and reproduction. Cultural selection has two mechanisms – imitation and social learning – that help to explain identities and interests (Wendt 1999:324).

According to Wendt, imitation tends to make actors more homogenous because by this mechanism actors imitate others that they see as ‘successful’ (Wendt 1999:325). The imitation process is similar to natural selection, but it is cognitive (the sharing of ideas is central), whereas natural selection is a ‘material process that operates behind the backs of actors’ (Wendt 1999:321). Wendt argues that imitation can proceed only if there already exist a collective identity. It is in the process of social learning – the second mechanism of cultural selection – where collective identity can develop (Wendt 1999:341). This attribute makes social learning of primary interest in Wendt’s perspective. Social learning is guided by the principle of ‘mirroring’. ‘The basic idea’, according to Wendt, ‘is that identities and their corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others’ (Wendt 1999:327). This implies that actors see themselves as a reflection of how Others ‘appraise’ them (Wendt 1999:327). However, this does not mean that states react to all Others’ treatments. According to Wendt, in the ‘mirroring’ process power and dependency relations are very important and, thus, ‘not all Others are equally significant’ (Wendt 1999:327).

Moreover, Wendt emphasises that identities are always in process, which means that there is a constant production and reproduction of social structures through an engagement in certain social practices. Wendt argues that in the states’ system egoistic identities and interests are dominant. But there exist four causal mechanisms or ‘master variables’ - interdependence,
common fate, homogeneity, and self-restrain – that influence states’ interaction and may change existing representations of Self and Other (Wendt 1999:343). In this way a collective identity formation can begin. In collective identity the distinction between Self and Other becomes blurred, or, in other words, Other becomes part of the understanding of Self (Wendt 1999:229). Whether identities can be seen as collective depends on how interests are defined and if there exist a ‘we-feeling’ or a sense of being part of a group (Wendt 1999:336-338). However, since egoistic identities and interests are dominant, the process of collective identity formation is a complicated one. The resistance to such formation is often very strong, because states want to preserve their sovereignty and individuality. Thus, identification is rarely perfect and ‘in most situations the best that can be expected is concentric circles of identification, where actors identify to varying degrees with others depending on who they are and what is at stake, while trying to meet their individual needs as well’ (Wendt 1999:364). Nevertheless, the fact that a collective identity can be formed, because identities are always contested and continuously in process, is of importance (Wendt 1999:340).

Hence, identity is the key notion of Wendt’s understanding of international politics. Identities inform states’ interests and, in turn, states’ actions. Since actors and structures are mutually constitutive, a research agenda should focus on relationship between social practice and identities.

It should be noticed that as every approach Wendt’s perspective has its own weaknesses. Smith (2000) criticises Wendt’s approach for ignoring agency level and being highly structural. Furthermore, Wendt is accused of leaving little space to the domestic politics’ level, which may have bigger influence on states’ identities than Wendt recognises (Smith 2000; Krasner 2000).

In this study it is expected that the employment of the Copenhagen school’s securitisation approach in the analysis will help to overcome this criticism and in combination with Wendt’s perspective will provide a productive way of analysing the construction, reproduction and change of states’ identities.

Identity and security are understood as intimately related concepts. Identity is a particular narrative, through which actors continuously produce and reproduce conceptions of threats. The construction of threats involves an identification of ‘Other’ and ‘Self’ against which the understanding of security is being articulated and identity is being reproduced. In that sense, it
becomes possible to study how identity is produced and reproduced through the discourse on security.

2.5. The main concepts

In discourse on security something is presented as an existential threat with the absolute priority of handling, in that way legitimising the breaking of normal political rules. Security discourse also serves in the reproduction of power and hegemony, because it is always linked to the notions of threats.

The object that is constructed in the discourse as existentially threatened is the referent for security.

As security means survival, survival for the state means maintaining its sovereignty that can be threatened by ‘anything that questions recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority’ (Buzan et al 1998:22). Having in mind the international system, the existential threats can be anything that endangers the existence of the rules, norms and institutions that constitute those regimes (Buzan et al 1998). Along the lines of Waever, threats seen as relevant in this paper are those that affect the self-determination and sovereignty of the state (Waever 1995).

States are seen as the main actors on the arena. This rather traditional choice is made because the state has a historically established set of practices of who can speak on behalf of the state and, as was discussed in the theoretical part, has a clearly formalised referent (Waever 1995). Furthermore, it is the state that has an authority to define social values within ‘territorially defined political and administrative entities’ (Ayoob 1997:129) that makes the state the most important object for this type of study.

Securitising actors in this study are the main political foreign policy makers of the chosen states. They have authority to act on behalf of the state and hold a power to perform securitisation (Buzan et al 1998). Namely, securitising actors in this study are the prime minister/chancellor of the state, the foreign minister/foreign secretary of the state and, in the case of Lithuania, the president, as the main representatives of the government. Having in mind that political decisions in most cases are based on the collective responsibility, the official speeches of these securitising actors represent a remarkable collective statement of the countries’ government’s positions.
Hence, a method where one analyses securitising actors’ statements and puts them into an integrated configuration, is employed in the analysis. Furthermore, the analysis is aimed to find constructions of national identities employed by the actors. Finally, the outcome of the analysis provide one with a possibility of discussing mechanisms of identities’ construction/reconstruction and open a possibility of outlining prospects for a collective European identity formation.

2.5.1. The structure of the empirical part of the study

In chapter III every country is analysed separately, guided by the following structure:
First, the main characteristics of each country are addressed. Second, referent object/objects, threats for security, and the values that are important for actors are identified, focusing on the discursive practices used by the securitising actors. Third, all four states’ securitising actors’ constructions are compared and conclusions are made. Furthermore, chapter IV discusses the process of the construction of contemporary European identities and addresses the issue of a collective European identity formation.
CHAPTER III: EUROPEAN IDENTITIES IN THE SECURITISATION PROCESS

3.1. Germany

3.1.1. The national identity understanding during the period of 1945-1998

Since the end of World War II German political actors have been strongly influenced by the idea of ‘European Germany’, first expressed in Thomas Mann’s statement that ‘we do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany’ (Marcussen et al 2001:109). Inclusion of ‘Europe’ in the construction of German interests provided a possibility to distinguish present from the nationalist and militarist past, which was thoroughly discredited by Nazi regime and militarism (Ekman 2001; Aggestam 2000; Marcussen et al 2001). Integration to Europe was immediately embraced as an opportunity to overcome this past. Besides, in the newly founded Christian Democratic Party (CDU) ‘the triptych of self-conscious anti-Nazism, Christian values, and dedication to European unity as a means of redemption for past German sins has played a crucial ideological role (Haas, in Marcussen et al 2001:109). Christianity, democracy and social market economy became the main values for the transformed Germany and the ground, on which the new identity was built. It can be said that the German past served as its ‘Other’ in the production of country’s new identity (Marcussen et al 2001).

In the end of the 1940s Chancellor Konrad Adenauer - active pro-European – supported the idea of Germany’s integration in the West and put a lot of efforts in the multilateralisation of German foreign policy (Marcussen et al 2001:109). Besides the European integration, multilateralism was seen as the second instrument of breaking up Germany’s militarist and nationalist history. Since then European integration and multilateralism have been the guiding principles of Germany’s foreign policy. Germany became a strong supporter of international institutionalism and, in order to become a reliable partner, took part in Western institutional structures, where North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU were considered to be of greatest importance. As Aggestam notices, German membership in these two institutions ‘constitutes the two pathways through which German conceptions of security have been, and still are, pursued today’ (Aggestam 2000:105). NATO has assured Germany’s ‘hard’ security needs, i.e. collective defence, while the EU has been an arena for the development of ‘soft’ security ideas 12.

12 A distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security has been made in the 1990s in the influencing of the broadening of security agenda. According to Archer, ‘hard’ security deals mainly with the territorial defence against an outside aggressor, while ‘soft’ security encompasses many aspects, ranging from internal stability to
Many IR scholars interpreted the end of the Cold War bipolarity and German reunification as a great opportunity for Germans to reflect on their European orientations and reconstruct national interests (Lantis 2001). Some scholars expected Germany to take a leading role in building the new European order, having in mind the disappearance of superpower overlay (Buzan 1990), German economic power and the geopolitical situation at the heart of Europe (Timmins 2001; Smith et al 1996). Nevertheless, Germans political actors did not reconsider their fundamental foreign policy orientations and have in the post-Cold War period exhibited ‘a remarkable continuity of the tradition in international affairs’ (Aggestam 2000:105).

3.1.2. Analysis of Germany’s securitising actors’ speeches

Analysis of speeches shows that Germany’s securitising actors continue to produce the national identity, following more than fifty years tradition and continue to include ‘Europe’ in the understanding of the national identity.

This incorporation of ‘Europe’ in Germany’s national identity has a reflection in the construction of the referent object for security. The study demonstrates that the primary referent in the actors’ language is Europe rather than just Germany. The actors are using terms ‘Germany’ and ‘Europe’ interchangeably or as closely linked. Shortly, the discursive strategy can be identified as following:

‘German foreign policy is politics in Europe, for Europe and naturally politics from Europe’ (Schroeder 2 February 2001).

Europe in the actors’ understandings embraces the EU and neighbouring countries, i.e. accession candidate countries to the EU as well as Russia and the Balkans.

Furthermore, in some cases, the referent object is the Western world, widened beyond Europe, and includes the US and Canada. It is worth noticing, that this referent object has been started to be used more often after the terrorist attack on New York on September 11 in 2001.

humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and combat of international crime (Archer 2001).

As mentioned, this study is concerned only with the securitising actors’ statements regarding relation to the EU. Relations with NATO are left outside the scope of analysis.

13 Buzan explains overlay as a situation where great power’s interests become predominant in a security region (1990:15), on break-up of the overlay look at p.41.

14 These include: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria.
Since Germany strongly supports the process of European integration, one of the biggest threats for European security seen by the securitising actors is the cessation of European integration and Eastern enlargement. *Ostpolitik*\(^\text{15}\) and pan-European politics that started in the 1960s still have an influence on the actors’ discursive practices.

The enlargement, integration and European security are closely linked in the actors’ statements. Enlargement and integration are mutually supportive and constitute a logical sequence, where the succession of one concept enhances development of the other, i.e. one concept is furthering the other. In securitising moves, argument is presented as follows: hindering enlargement endangers integration, what, in turn, puts European security in ‘danger’ as well:

> ‘Following the collapse of the Soviet empire the EU had to open up to the east, otherwise the very idea of European integration would have undermined itself and eventually self-destructed. (...) A divided system of states in Europe without an overarching order would in the long term make Europe a continent of uncertainty, and in the medium term these traditional lines of conflict would shift from Eastern Europe into the EU again’ (Fischer 12 May 2000).

The employment of language of threat is the most often used instrument in the discussion of enlargement/integration issue (as it is in the above given example). In some cases, for the purpose to strengthen the argument, the language of drama and binary oppositions such as integration-fragmentation, success-failure or strong Europe – weak Europe are employed. In that case, extremely ‘dark’ picture is painted in front of the eyes of the audience.

However, third type of statements is created using not language of threat, but rather including prosperity and peace arguments. In such a case, benefits of integration/enlargement are emphasised. Analysis gives clear signs that advocating European integration and Eastern enlargement of the EU, the German actors take firm ‘Europeanist’ position, arguing for ‘deepening and widening’ of the EU. This can be an identification of the continuation of fifty years of traditional construction of national identity.

Moreover, German securitising actors set statements in the boundaries of traditional dominant discursive practices, arguing that the continuity of the fifty years’ tradition is the best way for Germany/Europe to reach pacification, stability and prosperity.

\(^{15}\) German Chancellor Willi Brandt’s détente-oriented *Ostpolitik* was launched in 1969 and aimed to include the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European countries to the cooperation network (Lankowski 2001).
Continuity for the actors means an everlasting advocation of multilateralism. Multilateralism is considered to be the most important way of arranging and guaranteeing European and global cooperation and security. It is connected to security by logical sequence, arguing that multilateralism provides a possibility to cooperate, which in turn provides security and stability. In the purpose to strengthen the argument of multilateralism and persuade audience, binary oppositions and juxtapositions with ‘antagonistic order’ and unilateralism are utilised: ‘The immediate future will decide whether we will orient ourselves to a cooperative and multilateral international system or turn towards an ultimately antagonistic order, plagued by instability and heightened rivalries and conflicts concerning strategic resources, power and ideologies’(Fischer 27 May 2002).

Furthermore, this study finds that an important part in the securitisation process is attributed to liberal values. Emphasis on values is present in any single constructing move of the process. It seems that liberal values is a constitutive element in the production of Germany’s identity. The dangers that are present in the actors’ discursive practices, are at the same time threatening liberal values. Furthermore, in the German actors’ construction, Europe is seen as having a special set of values:

‘Europe is a continent of values, which have evolved over centuries, of human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and a unique social system founded on the principle of the social market economy’(Fischer 10 April 2002).

Besides, these values are considered to be not only safeguarded, but also to be widened as far as possible in the purpose of ensuring European security. It seems that the emphasis on these values can be linked to the presentation of Germany’s past as the ‘Other’ in German identity. According to Marcussen et al (2001), the emphasis on these values helps to negate German past and reassure the post-Second World War identity.

Hence, the actors see multilateralism and reliance on liberal values as the way of dealing with risks that are presented as existential threats. These threats can be divided in two categories. One category involves threats that are geographically based and, besides the cessation of integration/ enlargement threat, includes such issues as volatility in Russia, instability in the Balkans and uncertainty in the Middle East. Another category encompasses non-geographical threats. To this category belong such issues as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, international crime, drug trafficking, migration and ecological risks.

Certain similarities can be indicated in the production of existential threats, having in mind
**geographically based dangers.** One of the main similarities is that instability in the regions rather than direct military threat from those regions in the actors’ statements is portrayed as endangering Europe. This fact can be interpreted as a reflection of changed international conditions and demonstrates a shift from a strict-military to a broader understanding of security. Opposed to the Cold War thinking, when Russia served as the ‘Other’, a significant change can be noticed in the actors’ statements. Russia itself is not presenting a danger. Rather, it is unpredictability and instability in Russia that can endanger Europe. Emphasis on democracy and multilateral way of cooperation are the main elements, present in the statements on Russia:

‘(...). We seek partnership with Russia in the process of democratisation. A democratic, market-oriented and modern Russia, fully integrated into the network of European security, is in the fundamental interests of the states of the European Union’ (Fischer 3 February 2001).

As illustrated in this example, good relations with Russia are identified as an essential part of peace and stability in Europe. But only a democratic Russia can guarantee European security and for this reason German actors are prepared to help Russia in the process of democratisation.

In the securitising actors’ discursive practices, instability in the Balkans, as in the Russian case, also constitutes an existential threat to Europe. Crises in the former Yugoslavia escalated this dimension and increased attention to the Balkans. War in Bosnia, and later in Kosovo, forced German actors not only to react to the situation, but also to reformulate and reconsider their role in the military dimension as well.\(^\text{16}\) However, comparing the cases of Russia and Balkans, a significant difference can be identified. The Balkans are constructed as being ‘closer of becoming a part of Europe’ and as having a prospect of becoming ‘a member of the European family’. This kind of language is absent in the Russian case and a bigger distance is kept by the actors in relation to Russia.

It seems that concern for the Middle East comes because the region is a neighbouring area to Europe. Comparing with the previous two dangers, i.e. instability in the Balkans and Russia, there is a remarkable difference in the securitising actors’ statements. The region is perceived as more volatile, uncertain and unreliable compared with Russia or the Balkans. Besides, Europe’s role in ensuring stability is seen as being more modest and remote.

Analysing the production of non-geographical threats it is worth noticing that emphasis on

\(^{16}\) This aspect is further evaluated in the later part of the paper.
terrorism as a danger to European security in the securitising actors’ statements gained new ground after the terrorist attack of September 11. Since these threats are more commonly present in the statements, concerning NATO, only a brief analysis is given in this paper.

September 11 was a catalyst that escalated the articulation of dangers in this dimension and made it a priority agenda. These events made terrorism the most visible threat and, in turn, provided a legitimate case for securitisation. In this case a referent for security is considered to be not only Europe, but also the broader Western world. Besides, of importance is the fact that this danger is presented as coming from outside Europe, thus making Europe/Germany a supporter of democracy and peace. Discursive strategies at this dimension tend to involve notions of interdependence and indivisibility of security:

‘11 September showed us all that security in this one world is not divisible. We can only have security together’ (Schroeder 19 December 2001).

These instruments are employed in the construction of other non-geographical threats as well. Similarly, the threats are showed as coming from outside Europe. The presentation of such issues as security problems indicates that German actors operate in the ‘soft’ security dimension. Hence, it seems that the actors reinforce the identity, produced after the end of World War II and are willing to maintain their image as a civilian power.

The findings of the analysis indicate that the ideas of pacification and the use of non-military instruments in security issues are emphasised and promoted in the securitising actors’ statements. The origins of German strong anti-military commitment, expressed in the actors’ language can be explained as a reflection of its past negation. As already mentioned, the sense of German responsibility and non-militarism can be tracked back to the end of World War II, when a new conception started to be formed. German identity was created rejecting the ‘Machtstaat’ (power state) position and presenting its own historical past as its ‘Other’ (Marcussen et al 2001). New emphasis was put on non-military measures as an instrument for dealing with international security issues, giving an emphasis to the European integration project.

However, after the end of the Cold War it became more complicated for German actors to maintain the image of Germany as a genuinely civilian power. New discursive strategies are emerging, in which military means are seen as possible and necessary instrument for
ensuring security:

‘Despite the dominance of civilian factors, i.e. crisis prevention and crisis solution through political and economic measures, there must be no taboos against military intervention—carefully considered in each case’ (Schroeder 18 October 2001).

This production has gained ground in the influence of the Kosovo crisis. Kosovo was the main escalator for the reconstruction of the statements, giving to the actors a legitimate case for the discursive strategy. However, to deal with the general negative perception of the usage of military measures, the actors attempt to create an understanding that military means are employed only as the last and inevitable resort. Moreover, employment of military measures is linked to the future EU’s role in the international system. Military means and integration are considered to be guarantees for the stronger Europe’s role in the world.

It seems that at the centre of the construction has met two different conceptions of how Germany’s past should be interpreted. Possibly, the interpretation allowing the usage of military means, can gain its position over time. However, it should be stressed that to make that position milder it is always emphasised by German political leaders that it is \textit{ultimo ratio} means. This is a significant transformation in the German actors’ understanding of the EU role as a security actor. Having legitimacy, capabilities and political weight they can influence how the European security will be understood in the future very strongly. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten, that German actors, despite this shift, are still advocating multilateralism and integration. Germany’s securitising actors reinforce the existing national identity, maintaining the image as ‘good Europeans’. They emphasise the ‘soft’ dimension in security issues and remain strongly committed to the European integration project.
3.2. Britain

3.2.1. Short background

Many IR scholars characterise British national identity as deeply shaped by tradition (Peterson 1999; Aggestam 2000; Marcussen et al 2001). Anglo-Saxon ideology, having its origins from the time of the English Civil War and struggles against Catholic absolutism had huge influence on the formation of British national identity (Wallace 1991). The long history of imperialism and hegemony developed a sense of uniqueness and superiority of Britain over other European countries in British elites’ perceptions. Hence, British national identity has been created in opposition to Europe (Marcussen et al 2001). Strong cultural attachment to the ideas of national parliamentary sovereignty continues to be a forceful power, reinforcing the traditional understanding of British identity (Peterson 1999).

Moreover, the vision of Britain as a mediator and powerful player in the international system continue to influence political actors’ understanding. Shared believe in British greatness and dominance in the international system is rooted in Britain’s history as the world’s first global power because of the country’s early industrialisation (Peterson 1999). In that sense, economic and political dimensions have been closely related in the political actors’ thinking. The idea that Britain had a special task to wield influence globally was very strong, and political actors were looking at British external policy through the global prism, in terms of how Britain could contribute to the maintenance of world order (George 1998; Peterson 1999). Given that, European affairs for a long time were for British political elites a minor concern as they had international system to ‘worry about’.

World War II did not undermine British nationalism. Indeed, Britain and the US victoriously came from the war, strengthening Anglo-Saxon worldview and the existing national identity. As Wallace notices, ‘Britain and the US were the champions of freedom and democracy, a source of support and a symbol of hope against totalitarian threat to the resistance in occupied countries’ (Wallace 1991:71). This helped to reinforce the ‘special’ relationship with the US. The seeds of this relationship had been put during World War I, when Britain with the help from the US came from the war as a victor (Peterson 1999; Rasmussen 2001). Moreover, the outcome of World War II reinforced the view about uniqueness and superiority of British institutions as well as the idea of Britain as a global power and a balancer of power in Europe. As a result the existing detachment from British continental European neighbours was more
Besides, the privileged relation to the US during the Cold War era helped to maintain the image of Britain as a strong military power with great international influence. In spite of the fact that the relationship was very much asymmetrical in terms of power, it helped Britain to maintain its position as a global player. As Howorth notices, ‘so long as the Cold War lasted, and even after it ended, Atlanticism remained, for London, the primary reference’ (Howorth 2000:378).

Many IR scholars emphasise that the sense of superiority and exceptionalism as well as attachment to the ‘special’ relationship with the US continue to have a powerful influence to actors’ presentation of the issues in the post-Cold War era as well (George 1998; Peterson 1999; Howorth 2000, Aggestam 2000; Rasmussen 2001). More than twenty years after the entry into the European Community (EC), Britain was still regarded as the ‘awkward partner’ and ‘semi-detached’ from Europe (Bailey 1983; George 1992, 1994, in Marcussen et al 2001:111; George 1998). The end of the Cold War did not alter British actors’ position and in the first years at the 1990s they continued to pursue the traditional foreign policy, emphasising the role of military power and ‘special’ relationship with the US, constructing Britain rather ‘of’ than ‘in’ Europe (Aggestam 2000).

The continuing influence of the belief in British exceptionalism among British actors has caused serious difficulties in attempts to reframe the relationship with Europe (Wallace 1991; Aggestam 2000). Only with the election of the new Labour government in 1997 changes started to appear. The new Labour government has been trying to modify the traditional understanding and introduce new elements into discursive practices. It seems that the securitising actors have started to look for a new place for Britain. Those attempts are reflected in all important speeches of British securitising actors. Securitisation discourse reflects those attempts to locate Britain ‘at the heart of the EU’ and to redefine Britain’s relationship with Europe. More specifically, the main discussion evolves around the questions of what influence Britain can have in Europe and how it can contribute to the new European security order (Aggestam 2000).
3.2.2. Analysis of British securitising actors’ speeches

The results of analysis of British securitising actors’ speeches indicate that there are some differences compared with the findings of German securitising actors’ statements. First, the referent object for security in British actors’ securitising practices is not Europe, but Britain. Having in mind British exceptionalism and attachment to the deeply rooted national identity such a production becomes easy understandable. By distancing Europe from Britain the securitising actors create a powerful legitimate argument, which allows the reinforcement of the existing discursive elements. It is important to note that after the terror attack on New York on September 11 in 2001 the British actors have expanded the referent object for security, including the Western world as well. Significantly, in such a construction Europe is not singled out as a region with specific concerns. Quite opposite, the special focus is given to the common British and US concerns for security. This construction with an emphasis on transatlantic dimension can be understood as an attempt to strengthen the long existing ‘special’ relationship with the US and justify the existence of NATO.

Largely because of this loyalty to the US and NATO British political elites have been ‘uncomfortable’ in speaking about European security in relation to the EU (Aggestam 2000). Traditionally, ‘hard’ security issues were assigned to NATO, whereas the EU had a low profile and have been seen through the pragmatic prism. However, the changed international environment after the end of the Cold War have forced the British actors to adjust to new conditions and to re-evaluate the traditional position. It seems that the securitising actors are not certain about Britain’s future role yet. They cannot choose between the EU and NATO. As the EU is moving forward to a ‘higher’ agenda and has ambitions to play a role in security issues, the British actors try to reframe traditional discursive strategies and to find a new place for Britain. Since they still see Britain as an international power with great influence, the actors try to put Britain in a leading position in Europe. However, the continuing emphasis that the securitising actors give to NATO, limits their choices. So far the British actors have been trying to navigate between the two organisations and to place Britain somewhere in between, being a ‘bridge’ between the two (Gordon 2001). The idea of Britain being a ‘bridge’ between Europe and Atlantic is very powerful and strongly advocated. This position, as is hoped by the securitising actors, would help both to keep the special relationship with the US and, at the same time, to allow the achievement of bigger influence and power in
further developments of the EU:

‘Britain need its voice strong in Europe and bluntly Europe needs a strong Britain, rock solid in our alliance with the USA, yet determined to play its full part in shaping Europe’s destiny’ (Blair 02 October 2001).

British securitising actors’ attempts to portray Britain as a mediator between the US and the EU might be seen as rising from the deeply embedded Anglo-Saxon liberal ideology (Wallace 1991) as well as from a desire to maintain the ‘special’ relationship with the US. Tracks of this ideology tend to appear in most of the speeches, where, following the tradition, military dimension and view of Britain as a defender of international system are emphasised. A comparison between the British and German actors’ speeches indicates that military dimension is much more emphasised in British actors arguments. Some elements of symbolism can be identified in the area. The actors emphasise the military dimension, employing discursive strategies of ‘inevitability’ and ‘necessity’. They argue that political and economic instruments alone cannot guarantee stability and security. Following their arguments, presence of military means is necessary in order to back up political decisions:

‘Civilian assistance is no substitute for effective armed forces. The credibility of our foreign policy depended on military capability. This is true today’ (Straw 15 October 2002).

Hence, the British actors argue in more traditional security terms, emphasising the ‘hard’ security issues. This feature makes British actors’ construction differ significantly from that of the German actors.

Moreover, it seems that the securitising actors see military means and the defence area as the only opportunity to place Britain in a leading position in Europe (Howorth 2000). Britain has for a long time been considered by other European Union members as an ‘awkward’ and not fully reliable partner. The EU has, first of all, been driven forward by the cooperation between Germany and France. In that sense, British political actors had a sense of being apart from European affairs, especially when they where reluctant to join and participate in some European initiatives (Rasmussen 2001). For a long time the political actors did not worry about being left aside. But after the end of the Cold War, when the so much by the British actors emphasised ‘special’ relationship with the US became less and less special, the British actors started to feel uneasy as the sense that only a strong and influential Britain in Europe can be interesting to the US have started to dominate the agenda:

‘For Britain, the biggest decision we face in the next couple of decades is our relationship with Europe. For far too long British ambivalence to Europe has made us irrelevant in
Crises in the former Yugoslavia served as a legitimising case to argue for the importance of military means. In this area the securitising actors saw a possibility to put Britain in a new place, ‘appropriate’ for Britain (Howorth 2000). In this dimension Britain definitely could take a leading place, being the biggest military power in the EU. Given that, it becomes clear why so much attention is given to military means.

As it was shortly mentioned above, this attempt to find a new place for Britain is reflected in the overall pattern of securitisation. For this reason, the main danger, presented by British securitising actors, is not the cessation of enlargement, but rather ‘new’ or non-geographical threats, which facilitate the strengthening of the new argument that British actors try to create and at the same time help to persuade the audience, as illustrated by the following statements:

‘Most important now are three main threats: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the scourge of global terrorism; and failed and failing states’ (Straw 17 October 2002). ‘These threats are more unpredictable than the challenge we faced in the Soviet era’ (Straw 15 October 2002).

The securitisation of international terrorism reinforces the idea of Britain as an international mediator and as a ‘bridge’ between the EU and NATO. Moreover, condemnation of terrorism and rhetoric for the war against it and other ‘new threats’ serve as instruments for showing solidarity with the US and, by that, strengthening the ‘special’ relationship. A large ‘portion’ of idealism and symbolism is present in British actors’ securitising strategies. The strongest attempt is to show that Britain and the US share fundamental ideas and interests in world politics:

‘(...) recognise the fundamental commonality of our\textsuperscript{17} roots and values. America came to Europe’s aid twice in twenty-five years; and then stood by Europe for another forty-five years as it struggled with Soviet totalitarianism. Equally, the immediate reaction to the attacks on the US on September 11 was the same as if our own territories had been attacked’ (Straw 8 May 2002).

The British actors’ relations to the EU and the US contain a big contradiction. It seems that Wallace argument that idealism and symbolism frame the construction of the relationship with the US, while pragmatism is the main attribute in the discursive strategies on the EU (Wallace 1991:72), is still valid. This difference is clearly expressed in the British actors’ statements on the enlargement of the EU:

\textsuperscript{17} ‘Our’ in this context mean British and Americans.
‘A reunified Europe which delivers practical benefits to our citizens, be they jobs and investments or cleaner beaches and safer streets’ (Straw 17 October 2002).

Although both the German and the British actors support enlargement and see it as a way to guarantee stability in the region, the argument behind is very different. In contrast to the German actors, British securitising actors put the issue of enlargement in the frames of ‘practical Britain’ discursive strategy. They emphasise ‘enlightened self-interest’ and ‘benefits of enlargement’ that constitute this discursive practice.

Having in mind British reluctance and ‘awkwardness’ in European affairs it makes one wonder why Britain is strongly advocating Eastern enlargement. Possibly some other interests may be hidden beyond British actors’ pragmatism and economic benefits elements. Peterson (1999) argues that favouring enlargement British political actors support broadening of the EU as opposed to deepening. By this it is hoped that accession of new countries would slow down European integration process and keep back a development of a federalist Europe project, which British actors are anxious about.

Importantly, cessation of European integration is not seen as an existential threat. Quite opposite, British actors perceive any move towards federalist Europe as a threat to British national identity and sovereignty. British exceptionalism has created a dilemma of ‘whether or not to participate in European initiatives’ (Marcussen et al 2001:112). On the one hand, participating in European integration process means going in the direction that British actors may not be willing to go. On the other, failing to participate in the process means losing a chance to influence the European integration. Under such conditions British securitising actors stress that they support only a vision of the EU as a union of sovereign states and radically reject any idea of federalist Europe:

‘Europe is not and will not become a super state. (...) A super state is not on the agenda because Europe is stronger with strong democratic member states. If the power of those states is weakened then the strength of Europe will also be weakened and Europe will be poorer as a result’ (Cook 16 November 2000).

It seems that British nationalism and attachment to national sovereignty continue play an

\[18\] In the domestic context, crime and immigration are linked to securitisation of enlargement and presented as existential threats. This detail shows British actors’ reflection to the change in understanding of what constitutes security issues. The securitisation of these issues fall in the ‘soft’ dimension of security. Since the construction of these threats takes a very small place in the overall securitisation process, the further discussion of this issue is left outside the scope of this paper.
important role in the securitisation process. Europe has not been incorporated in the
construction of the national identity. This marks a significant difference having Germany’s
securitising actors in mind who see the cessation of European integration as the biggest threat
to European security. This once again shows how different productions of national identity
lead to the employment of different discursive strategies.

It can be mentioned that other geographical threats, which are present in German actors’
discursive strategies, appear rarely in British securitising actors’ speeches. Such issues as
relationship with Russia or instability in the Balkans are mentioned in statements, but they are
not presented as existential threats. Since the British actors are concerned to find a new place
for Britain in Europe, the emphasis is put on reinforcement of the ‘special’ relationship with
the US, existence of NATO and Eastern enlargement process. However, in the cases where
these other issues are indeed mentioned, the British actors portray Britain as an international
player and promoter of liberal values.

Liberal values, as in the German case, is the ‘red line’, appearing in the presentation of
different existential threats, binding different arguments and discursive strategies. Similarly to
Germany’s securitising actors, the British actors see maintenance of liberal values as the most
important way of reaching security and stability:

‘And of course the surest way to stability is through the very values of freedom, democracy
and justice. Where these are strong, the people push for moderation and order. Where they
are absent, regimes act unchecked by popular accountability and pose a threat; and the
threat spreads’ (Blair 7 April 2002).

British securitising actors put much more emphasis on the dimension of broadening of liberal
values. Again, marks of Anglo-Saxon ideology can be identified in the discursive practices.
Democracy, liberty and rule of the law are strongly emphasised in British actors’ statements.
This claim of strong and deep democratic practice is a significant element, which, according
to Wallace, is the only one left from the 1950s identity, when Britain had a self-image as ‘a
proud and great nation in 1950s: as an industrial power of the first rank, as a leader in military
and civil high technology, as second largest GNP as well as the home of the strongest and
most deeply rooted democracy in Europe’ (Wallace 1991:73). Reinforcement of the view of
Britain as a defender and exporter of liberal values can be seen as a contribution to the
perception that ‘Britain still wields important influence in the world’ (Macleod 1997:183).
To conclude, the production of the national identity has experienced some modifications with the change of the government in 1997. British securitising actors attempt to find a new place for Britain in Europe. However, the attachment to the traditional construction of identity, emphasis on British exceptionalism and sovereignty hinder Britain to incorporate Europe into the national identity. British securitising actors continue emphasise the military dimension of security and want to maintain an image of Britain as a powerful and internationally influential country.
3.3. Sweden

3.3.1. Short background

Like Britain, Sweden is one of the oldest nation-states in Europe and is located on the periphery of the continent (Bergquist 2000). Like Britain, Sweden has been characterised as a reluctant and exceptionalist European country. Similarly to Britain, after World War II Sweden created its national identity in contrast to Europe. However, ideas and interests, lying behind the production of national identity are different from those that served as a foundation for the British national identity. According to Waever, after World War II Sweden’s identity has been based on ‘a curious congruity between the Scandinavian model of the ideal state – welfare state – and the Nordic\(^{19}\) security arrangement’ (1992:84) as well as Sweden’s internationalism (that was a less significant component in the process of national identity construction).

The understanding of the nation-state has been put in a ‘Nordic’ discourse that emphasises ‘the cultural, political and moral distinctiveness of Norden’ (Hansen 2002:11). The Swedish model was a result of a competition between capitalism and communism, providing the country with a ‘middle’ or ‘third way’ (Thomas 1996). In that sense, Sweden’s social model of the modern, enlightened and anti-military society was presented as better and more moral than those existing at that time in the rest of Europe. A very important role in the framing played the notion of the welfare state that indicated not only prosperity and progress, but equality and solidarity as well (Waever 1992; Trägårdh 2002). Given that, the existing pattern was perceived as being ‘distinctly modern and highly efficient’ (Trägårdh 2002:131), strengthening the idea of Sweden as the most modern and the most democratic nation in the world as well as exhibiting moral superiority over other countries.

Sweden’s anti-militarism and the idea of higher morality were expressed in the form of neutrality. Differently from other European countries, which experienced frequent wars and occupation of their territories, Sweden has stayed out of a war for more than 200 years (Lindqvist 1999) and has chosen a different path for its security arrangements. Originally, the concept of neutrality has evolved since 1814 ‘as a de facto attempt to remain

\(^{19}\) ’Norden’ and ‘Nordic’ are terms used for the region consisting of five countries – Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland (Vaerno 1999:184). It should be noticed that in English usage, the term ‘Scandinavia’ can denote this area as well. However, the term ‘Scandinavia’ should be used to denote the area that embraces only Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (Neumann 1999:117-18).
outside of alliances and avoid armed conflict’ (Anderson 2001:293). During the Cold War superpower agenda dominated Swedish actors’ understanding, and neutrality was placed in the discourse of East-West confrontation. However, in spite of the centrality of East-West opposition, Sweden was presented as having lower tensions than Europe and as keeping a distance from Great Powers. During the Cold War Sweden was embedded in the European security system as a whole, but it was acting in a ‘Nordic’ sub-region of European security order. Keeping lower tension than the rest of Europe, but at the same time emphasising its national defence, Sweden created a distinct shape that has been maintained until the end of the Cold War (Waever 1992; Archer 1998).

At this point it is necessary to stress that Swedish national identity had a remarkable peculiarity. As it was mentioned, the national identity was produced by making contrasting the country to Europe and was presented as having higher morality than Europe. This kind of construction had a very important aspect. In order to maintain this type of identity, it had to be practically expressed, i.e. Sweden actually had to be living in the conditions of lower tensions. Swedish actors found a solution in making Sweden an active actor in the international scene (Waever 1992).

The country’s internationalism has helped to maintain its self-perception as a different, more moral and modern sovereign state (Anderson 2001:286). At the same time the Swedish actors emphasised the binding nature on international law and saw the strengthening of international law as a fundamental principle of Swedish foreign policy. Respect for international law was regarded as ‘a precondition for peace and security and in particular for the integrity and independence of small states’ (Goldman 1991:127). After World War II Sweden became an enthusiastic supporter of the UN and sympathiser of the peoples of the Third World. In this way, a moralist view of rational, democratic and modern Sweden could have been reinforced (Trägårdh 2002).

The end of the Cold War has strongly shaken the ground of national identity production. Since Swedish actors formed its identity in opposition to Europe, i.e. as having better than Europe, it vitally depended ‘on Europe remaining divided, highly armed and marked by a certain level of tension’ (Waever 1992:79). The end of bipolarity has eliminated those

20 In the purpose to make neutrality concept relevant in practice, a strong emphasis has been put on national defence. As Miles notices, ‘total defence incorporated the maintenance of large armed forces and exclusive support for indigenous technological and military industries’ (1997:42).
European characteristics. Now Europe has taken a lead, presenting positive and desirable movements. In that sense, Sweden has started to lose an important part of its national identity, becoming ‘worse’ than Europe (Waever 1992).

Hence, Swedish political actors have had to redefine and reconstruct their national identity. They have been forced to look for a new place in the European constellation without opposition to Europe. Swedish actors’ production has taken a significant shift from the old way of presenting the national identity. Swedish political elites, being afraid to become isolated, have started to see Europe as ‘a solution to managing the post-cold war security risks faced by the Nordic states’ (Ingebritsen 1998:95). The joining of the EU in 1995 exhibits this search for a new identity. However, the membership of the EU has brought new challenges for Swedish actors. One of the biggest problems the Swedish actors have been facing is the question of how ‘the country should react to policy initiatives set by the EU and NATO powers on future security cooperation’ (Miles 2000:9). Besides, one of the main elements of Swedish national identity – neutrality – started to be questioned and now is in the process of change (Hallenberg 2000).

3.3.2. Analysis of Swedish securitising actors’ speeches

Analysis demonstrates the Swedish actors’ preoccupation with the question of Europe and their attempts to reframe the understanding of the national identity in the changed international environment. An effort to adapt neutrality concept to new conditions colours the securitisation pattern.

In the actors’ statements, the referent object for security is Sweden and the Baltic Sea region. Like the British actors, Swedish securitising actors did not incorporate Europe in their understanding of national identity and continue formulate issues in relation to Sweden. In opposition to the German actors, the Swedish actors do not use terms of ‘Sweden’ and ‘Europe’ interchangeably. Even though ‘Europe’ is present in the actors’ statements, first and foremost dangers are presented as exposing risks to Sweden and the Baltic Sea region. However, the Swedish securitising actors seem to support the idea of indivisibility of European security and argue that security in the Baltic Sea region is ‘an issue for the whole Europe and the North American countries’ (Lindh 10 February 1999).

It seems that the Baltic Sea region takes an important place in the actors’ discursive practices. The emphasis on this dimension may be stemming from the Swedish actors’ attempts to react to the changed international settings. After the end of the Cold War, when the existing construction of ‘Norden’ started to lose its relevance, the Swedish actors began to see the Baltic Sea region as a new area for their interests. The Baltic Sea region ideally fits into the post-Cold War Europe’s discourse, because, first, it is a new project with a great potential (in contrast to Norden that is an old one). Second, this area is non-state based, which makes it especially appropriate for a small state like Sweden that fears domination from a great power. Third, it responds to a new European practice of network and region building (Waever 1992). Finally, the historical connections in the region play its part in the process.

Since Swedish actors put strong emphasis on the Baltic Sea region, it can be expected that the cessation of Eastern enlargement of the EU will be presented as one of the main threat to European security. It is worth noticing that the discursive practice is closer to the British construction than to the German one. Like the British political elites, the Swedish actors did not comprise Europe in the understanding of Swedish national identity and, largely because of this, the cessation of enlargement and the cessation of European integration are not interchangeable issues.

Instead of employing the language of drama and urgency, the Swedish actors prefer to put the enlargement issue in the discourse of ‘peace’ and ‘interdependence’, emphasising benefits and gains of enlargement. They show how the enlargement would enhance security and stability and how crucial this process is, emphasising economic elements as well as liberal values in the issue:

‘Enlargement will make our continent more stable and secure. Co-operation in the European Union prevents violent conflicts. Through enlargement, more countries will participate in a Union that promotes the principles of democracy, good governance, the rule of law and respect for human and minority rights. A Europe based on common, democratic values, is a Europe where our children can feel secure. This is also important for democracy and development in countries outside the European Union. Secondly, enlargement will make our continent richer by offering growth and prosperity’ (Lindh 28 September 2000).

It seems that the Swedish actors still have a strong attachment to the idea of solidarity. In emphasising this idea the Swedish securitising actors can preserve the traditional elements in framing the national identity, by that reinforcing the existing pattern.
It is worth noticing that Swedish securitising actors strongly advocate the Baltic States for the accession to the EU. It might be that the incorporation of ‘solidarity’ in the construction of threats reinforces the idea of Sweden as an active actor with high morality in the international arena. Furthermore, this dimension may be related to the Swedish actors’ attempts to reinforce the idea of the Baltic Sea region. Having Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the EU, would strengthen this dimension in the Union, thus, giving more attention to the region and providing Sweden with a leading role in it.

Analysis indicates that Russia takes an important place in the discursive practices on the Baltic Sea region. Since Russia is geographically close to Sweden, it is seen as a potential part in the Baltic Sea region. Furthermore, Russia is perceived as an important factor in security understanding. As Dahl notices, from ‘a historical perspective, Russia continues to be viewed as a neighbour with which it is urgent to uphold a constructive dialogue and involve in extensive forms of cooperation’ (Dahl 1999:141).

Similar to the German actors’ statements, Russia itself in the Swedish actors’ perspective is not seen as presenting a direct threat. Rather it is the undemocratic development in Russia that creates a danger. Like the German actors, the Swedish securitising actors consider integration of Russia in European cooperation to be the best instrument of countering the danger:

‘A democratic, prosperous Russia integrated into European cooperation and the global economy is a key partner in the efforts to ensure stability and security in Europe’ (Persson 24 April 2002).

Often, as a sub-part of the discursive practice, Ukraine is included in the same framework. It seems that this dimension is a result of the Swedish actors’ self-perception of Sweden as an internationally active country.

According to Dahl (1999), internationalism constitutes an active element for reinforcing Swedish neutrality (Dahl 1999). Cooperation and action under the UN mandate is strongly promoted. It seems that the Swedish actors’ emphasis on peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention and crisis management helps to maintain the tradition of the Swedish international activism and neutrality strategy. With the end of bipolarity in Europe, Swedish actors’ attention has shifted from the Third World countries to the ‘closer abroad’ (Dahl 1999). The Swedish international activism and a sense of morality are strongly expressed in
statements on the Balkans, Russia and Ukraine, with a particular emphasis on crisis management dimension.

The Swedish actors’ focus on crisis management dimension can be seen as a search for a new place for Sweden in the changed international environment. As Hallenberg notices, ‘the political actors have needed to balance the requirements of non-alignment with the new requirements placed on the state that belongs to the EU, an organisation that has a very intimate relationship with NATO’ (2000:26). To manage this tension between the neutrality and obligations as a member of the EU has been a prime challenge for the Swedish actors. The result was that the securitising actors no longer present the cooperation with the EU countries as a threat to Swedish neutrality. This constitutes the most significant transformation in the Swedish actors’ production of national identity.

The results of the analysis also point out that the term ‘neutrality’ has been replaced and is more often referred as to ‘non-alignment’. Non-alignment, in Swedish actors’ words, would allow Sweden to play an independent, and, thus, effective role. Actually, the argument is the same as in the Cold War era, although adapted to the new situation. In the purpose to put more weight in and reinforce the argument, it is often referred to the Cold War era to show that neutrality was the ‘right’ position, was functioning and giving good results:

‘Non-alignment has widespread popular support and serves us well by contributing to stability in this part of Europe’. It enables us to take up independent positions. During the Cold War, it successfully kept us from becoming involved in conflicts between the superpower blocs and helped reduce tensions in our immediate neighbourhood. It enables us to maintain a strong and credible proactive stance on disarmament issues...’ (Lindh 24 January 2001, in Sälen).

It can be that such a strategy is an allusion to Sweden’s ‘golden age’, moral superiority and stable national identity, providing a stable ground and legitimising the existing construction.

Furthermore, there seem to be clear indications that security is understood in a broader perspective than ‘hard’ security. In that sense, the Swedish actors’ position is nearer to the German perspective than to the British securitising actors’ standpoint, because both the Swedish and the German actors put strong emphasis on the ‘soft’ security dimension. The Swedish actors see many opportunities in using ‘soft’ security instruments:

‘...We can weave together the fates of people by means of trade, personal exchanges and political cooperation. We can –in relation to each other –support democratic development’

22 Read: ‘Northern part’.
and demand respect for human rights. Strength, in security policy sense of the word, is measured today more in economic, social and democratic terms than military ones’ (Lindh 16 December 1998).

The ‘soft’ security dimension is, in Dahl’s words, ‘a continuance that was present already before the end of the Cold War, in the influence of the understanding of the welfare state and internationalism’ (1999:145). It seems that emphasising the ‘soft’ security dimension the Swedish actors reproduce the existing national identity. This attachment to the traditional elements influences the Swedish actors’ understanding of the European integration project as well.

Maintaining the self-perception of Sweden as an exceptional country, the Swedish actors did not see a necessity for integration into Europe for a long time. As Ingebritsen notices, Sweden, as well as other Nordic countries, ‘historically resisted the idea of European unity (Ingebritsen 1998:ix). For a long time Swedish actors were opposed to a membership in the EU, arguing that Swedish neutrality would be threatened and that its high standards of welfare would be undermined (Anderson 2001; George 2001). However, the changed international situation in the post-Cold War era forced the Swedish political actors to reconsider their position as the price of not participating in European integration started to become too high. Hence, the position started to change and integration into Europe was presented as an unavoidable process.

Nevertheless, the securitising actors tend to take a rather pragmatic view of the EU’s further development, understanding integration to Europe mostly as an economic necessity (Miles 2000:231). Being strongly attached to the idea of sovereignty, the Swedish actors have firmly rejected a project of a European federation and emphasised the intergovernmental dimension of cooperation:

‘I do not believe in a big bang reform of the EU, or in a United States of Europe. (…). I believe in a step-by-step approach, realizing differences between countries. We need a continuing balance between national governments and EU institutions such as the Council and the Commission’ (Lindh 1 June 2001).

Like the British actors, they support the idea of the EU in widening rather than deepening. Furthermore, for the Swedish actors the idea of a sovereign nation-state is compatible with Swedish internationalism (Lawler 1997). Thus, the Swedish actors may see the deep integration into the EU as threatening Swedish international activity, which, in turn, threatens
the national identity. It seems that this aspect is strongly influencing the actors’ statements and has a firm ground in supporting the idea of Europe of nation-states.
3.4. Lithuania

3.4.1. Short background

Lithuania is a small country with a long history. The geographical location has had a strong influence on the production of Lithuania’s national identity. According to Ashbourne, ‘in a small state such as Lithuania, geopolitics has a greater influence than in a larger state which is more capable of adequately defending itself against potential aggressors’ (Ashbourne 1999:67). Many times specific political strategic and political interests of the West and the East have clashed in the Baltic region and have changed the path of the country’s development. As many authors notice, Lithuania has been a battleground for more powerful and aggressive neighbours in the East and the West (Vilkas 1992; Vardys and Sedaitis 1997; Archer 1998; Ashbourne 1999; Lane 2002).

The primary concerns of Lithuanian political actors the first years after the restoration of its independence in 1991 have been attempts to gain recognition from the other countries, to preserve territorial unity and create a distinct national identity (Ashbourne 1999). As Lithuania did not exist as an independent actor in the international arena during the Soviet time, it was not an easy task. Quoting Vares and Zhuryari, in the time of Soviet occupation ‘there existed only the symbolic functioning of the Baltic foreign ministries, staffed by five or six people ... always under the supervision of Moscow’ (Vares and Zhuryari 1992:133). Furthermore, from the Western point of view Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia exhibited a ‘grey’ zone, being ‘a blank spot on the mental or metaphoric map of Europe’ (Joenniemi, in Archer 1998:120). Thus, Lithuanian political actors had to ‘fill’ this ‘empty spot’, creating a distinct post-Soviet identity. In this process of the construction of national identity, historical experience and collective memories have been powerful symbolic tools. Two historical periods are of particular importance. The first is the period between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, when Lithuania was one of the greatest powers in Europe, withstanding invasions from the West and East (Ashbourne 1999). The reference to this period of the empire served as a basis for the liberation movement from the Tsarist Russia in the beginning of the twentieth century. After the restoration of independence in the 1991 Lithuanian political actors used to emphasise that they differ from Latvia and Estonia in the sense that Lithuania has a long history, whereas other two Baltic countries emerged in the international arena only in the inter-war period in the twentieth century (Ashbourne 1999).
The second period is an independent Lithuanian nation-state between the two world wars in the twentieth century. This period reinforced the cultural foundations of identity and later, in the period of Soviet occupation, helped to resist the assimilations attempts from the Soviet side (Lane 2002). Lithuanian political elites have constantly made the allusion to this period as a legitimating case for a restoration of independence in the 1991. Furthermore, making a link to this inter-war period of independence, Lithuanian political actors create a powerful argument in arguing that Lithuanian roots lies in Europe and that the country has always been a part of Europe, but has been occupied by the Soviet Union for more than fifty years (Archer and Jones 1999).

Even though the bipolarity after the Cold War was diminishing, the differences between the West and the East have still existed and strongly influenced Lithuanian political actors’ understanding. One of the cornerstones in the production of the national identity has been a ‘return to Europe’ discursive practice. The political actors of Lithuania have argued that the country has shared European culture for centuries and its historical and cultural roots lie in Europe. Using this argument they want to differentiate Lithuania from the East, so making the East its ‘Other’. In general, identification with the West and reference to belonging to European space in political, cultural and geographical sense makes a firm basis for the construction of national identity.

At this point it is worth noticing that ‘Europe’ in Lithuanian political actors’ understanding denotes the social and political space occupied by the EU. As Risse states, even though Lithuania geographically is a part of Europe, Lithuanian political actors construct their arguments for membership in West European organisations as a ‘return to Europe’ ‘as if they were currently outside the continent’ (Risse 2002:12). In security search Lithuanian political actors’ choices are strongly influenced by this ideological dimension. Interweaving country’s political path with the West, Lithuanian political elites put equal emphasis on NATO and the EU membership (Lane 2002), but NATO is seen as the ‘hard’ security provider, while the EU is understood in the ‘soft’ security terms.

Lithuanian actors’ emphasis on the membership of NATO might be seen as an expression for traditional security guarantees. According to Archer, after regaining its independence, Lithuania (as well as Latvia and Estonia) “emerged into a Hobbesian world where it seemed that their existence could well be ‘nasty, brutish and short’” (Archer 1998:128). The political actors have been influenced by the post-war experience and almost fifty years of occupation.
It is quite natural that they were mainly concerned with the traditional ‘hard’ security concerns. Even though Lithuania has managed to move from the uncertain ‘Hobbesian’ security environment to a more stable in the middle of the 1990s, the attachment to ‘hard’ security matters is still strong in the statements. Lithuanian political actors hope to get collective defence guarantees from a NATO membership and, in the case of becoming a member, they ‘would expect that their security would be the concern of all other member states of the Alliance’ (Archer and Jones 1999:170). Hence, the political actors are trying to reproduce Lithuania’s identity, making links to Western Europe and presenting the East as its significant ‘Other’.

3.4.2 Analysis of Lithuanian securitising actors’ speeches

The analysis of the securitising actors’ statements gives different results in comparison to German, British or Swedish political actors’ speeches. It seems that the basic grounds for these different discursive practices come from the distinct historical experience, which is especially coloured by the experience of the Soviet occupation from 1940-1990.

The results of the analysis of the period 1998-2002 indicate that Lithuanian securitising actors use the same discursive strategies as in the beginning of the 1990s, maintaining the Western orientation. As Lane aptly marks, the Western orientation is ‘composed in equal parts of attraction and repulsion: attraction to Europe whose civilization it shared; repulsion from the Soviet Union and Russia, whose values and culture were alien’ (Lane 2002:201). The return to Europe’ discursive strategy is still very much alive.

According to Jurgaitiene and Järre (1997), to get integrated into ‘Europe’, Lithuanian political actors had to change the value orientations. This was done by explicitly counterpoising national values to the Soviet/Russian ones. Framing Russia as Lithuania’s ‘Other’ the securitising actors placed themselves in ‘Europe’. They emphasise that Lithuanians always have seen themselves as a European nation. The securitising actors state that they belong to the Western culture and are guided by the Western values, so attempting to overcome a separation from the West:

23 Since this study is concerned with the understanding of security in the relation to the EU, deeper analysis of the ideas and interests for the membership in NATO is left outside the scope of the analysis.
'If you come to Lithuania today, you will find an open pro-Western democracy. You will find a free market economy that is one of the fastest growing in northern Europe. You will also find young people who have eagerly embraced the West as a model and magnet’ (Adamkus 27 March 2002).

In the political actors’ statements the referent object for security is Lithuania and the Baltic Sea region. It seems that the securitising actors tend to place the Baltic Sea region’s security in the context of European security and vice-versa, stating that Baltic security problems affect Europe as a whole and that security of one country should not be gained at the expense of another:

‘Baltic security is European security ... There can be no separate Baltic security and no European security without the Baltics; there is only one indivisible European security for all. Lithuania will continue to do its part, at the regional and pan-European levels, to enhance the common security of all of Europe’ (Saudargas 02 April 1998).

As Van Ham argues, this type of argumentation might be stemming from the Lithuanian political actors’ considerations that Lithuania is ‘a litmus test for Russia’s international behaviour and role vis-à-vis its neighbours and the West in general’ (Van Ham 1999:236). Furthermore, threats to sovereignty still occupy an important position in the actors’ understanding. The political actors emphasise that Lithuania is a small country and making the Baltic Sea region a referent object they broaden the space to be secured.

According to Jurgaitiene and Järre (1997), one of the leading factors that have stimulated the Baltic cooperation was the fear of Russian military power. For this reason, the possibility to build a common security region was very welcomed. Besides, there was a support from the Western European countries for such cooperation. In that sense, the Baltic region cooperation has been seen as bringing Lithuania closer to ‘Europe’ (Waever 1997b:312) and the Baltic Sea region cooperation has been strongly advocated.

The securitising actors are increasingly trying to identify the country as being closer to Poland than to Estonia or Latvia. Emphasising that both Lithuania and Poland are catholic countries and has a common historical past, they are trying to create an image of closeness. It seems that the political actors are willing to be associated with Central Europe rather than with Europe’s Northern part. Archer and Jones argue that this change is related to the rise of the movement towards closer association with NATO in Central European states. In that sense Lithuanian actors turn Poland into a bridge that links Lithuania with the EU and NATO (Archer and Jones 1999).
Since one of the key elements in the production of national identity is ‘the return to Europe’ discursive strategy, it is natural that in the securitising actors’ statements the cessation of the enlargement is presented as the main existential threat to Lithuanian/Baltic security as well as to European security. Lithuanian securitising actors argue that country’s security can be ensured only through integration into the European and transatlantic institutions. Even though the securitising actors want traditional security guarantees from NATO, the ‘soft’ security dimension, provided by the EU is seen as of equal importance. According to Van Ham, the political actors believe that ‘joining the EU provides Lithuania de facto participation within the security community that underpins Europe’s integration process’ (Van Ham 1999:227). For this reason the statements are coloured by an attempt to show that Lithuania has a right to be in the ‘European family’.

Moreover, failure to enlarge the EU eastwards is shown as jeopardising not only domestic reforms and democratic developments in the country, but as endangering Europe as well. The language of threat and drama is employed in the same way as in German securitising actors’ statements:

‘Without a successful enlargement there could be no successful future of the EU’ (Valionis 09 December 2001).

Furthermore, the political actors want to prove that Lithuania is a valuable associate. The securitising actors are quick to stress that Lithuania is a reliable cooperation partner and that the country has good relations to its neighbours:

‘A most significant contribution of Lithuania to the European security is its ability to restore and strengthen the statehood by peaceful means. If asked today about Lithuania’s possible role in the world, I would respond that our experience has evolved into a set of tools, which is called the policy of good neighbourly relations’ (Adamkus 20 June 1998).

Besides, the Baltic Sea region is described as an intermediary area between Europe and Russia, as a bridge between the East and the West. It seems that Russia is still one of the main preoccupations of the Lithuanian securitising actors. However, it should be noticed that the construction of threats in relation to Russia has exhibited a significant shift.

The first years after the restoration of independence Lithuanian securitising actors identified Russia as the main threat to Lithuania’s sovereignty (Archer 1998). The memory of more than fifty years of Soviet occupation has been deeply embedded in the securitising actors minds.
and continued to influence their statements and constructions of threats. It seems that Noreen’s statement that ‘small states react to lessons from history rather than current military threats’ (Noreen 2001:98) was valid during the first years of independence. The belief that Lithuania and Russia were in ‘a zero sum game’ in the beginning of the 1990s was strong among Lithuanian political actors (Lane 2002:201). Lithuanian political actors were afraid to become a new grey zone between Russia and NATO or to fall back to the Russian sphere of influence (Archer and Jones 1999). Russia was portrayed as an enemy and by that Lithuanian actors have found a significant ‘Other’ in the national identity production.

However, in the later years, Russia’s image as an enemy has started to be dissolved and, instead of portraying Russia itself as an exposing danger, **instability and unpredictability in Russia** has started to be seen as an existential threat. Lithuanian securitising actors make no reference to Russia as an immediate military threat. They are eager to emphasise that Lithuania’s integration to European institutions is made in the absence of any direct threat and is a ‘natural’ return to history and development. With this shift the political actors are coming close to other analysed actors’ statements, which can be indication that they have adapted the official language to the EU countries’ vocabulary. Lithuanian political actors point to the country’s good relationship with Russia and display a wish to cooperate with it. Even more, they state that security must be maintained not against, but in cooperation with Russia:

‘**Maintaining good and friendly relations with Russia is one of our principal interests. Lithuania is interested to continue the active political dialogue with Russia and develop practical, mutually beneficial co-operation within the framework of existing institutions**’ (Adamkus 23 April 1998).

Furthermore, Lithuanian securitising actors follow the same pattern as German, British and Swedish securitising actors, arguing that only a democratic and stable Russia can guarantee security in Europe. The shift in the threat construction from ‘Russia as the enemy’ to ‘the instability and unpredictability in Russia’ is of significant importance. This change shows that Lithuanian securitising actors are reinterpreting the historical experience and adapt their language to that of Western European countries. Hence, it can be said that identity production and the process of socialisation are intimately connected. Through an integration process to the European institutions the identity is being reconstructed and adapted to new conditions at the same time influencing the identification of existential threats.

The socialisation process and adaptation of language can be identified in the framing of issues
as existential threats that are not directly connected to Lithuania’s sovereignty. Many **new issues** are portrayed as **existential threats**:

‘In a world where globalisation has an ever increasing weight, no one can stand up alone against international terrorism, international crime, cyber crime, drugs and human trafficking, degradation of the environment, or spreading diseases’ (Valionis 16 February 2002).

It is important to note that reasoning concerning such threats is often placed in a European context, emphasising that only integration and close cooperation among European countries can counter these threats. In this context the securitising actors emphasise the importance of cooperation, solidarity and indivisibility of security. As well as in other countries’ securitising actors’ statements, September 11 escalated the appearance of such arguments. By condemning the terror attack and expressing solidarity with the US, Lithuanian securitising actors can show that they share the same values as the US and the Western European countries:

‘The attacks of September 11 were the attacks against the democratic values that we share and therefore these attacks were against all of us. In the fight against terrorism there can be no half allies, no half enemies and no half measures. We must stand all united, identify our goals, resource them and seek them by all measures proper to our democratic societies’ (Valionis 18 April 2002).

Furthermore, the securitising actors construct Lithuania as an actively engaging country in the international arena. The securitising actors stress that Lithuania is a small country and for this reason cannot be safe alone. The securitising actors put emphasis on cooperation and solidarity, recognising the importance of political and economic means in solving international conflicts. However, the ‘soft’ security dimension is seen as a necessary, but not sufficient element to guarantee Lithuanian security. Lithuanian securitising actors are very eager to become a NATO member and for this reason put an equal emphasis on ‘hard’ security dimension as well:

‘Confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) along with the development of self-defence capabilities and arms control measures, will also play an important role in promoting security and stability in the region’ (Saudargas 02 April 1998).

To conclude, the traditional security understanding is still influencing the Lithuanian securitising actors’ discursive strategies. However, it should be emphasised that a broadening of the security agenda is taking place. This shift may be seen as a result of imitation mechanism of the socialisation process in the identity formation.
3.5. A Comparison of The Securitising Actors’ Constructions of Identity

The analysis of German, British, Swedish and Lithuanian securitising actors’ discourses on security indicates that all four countries have had to reconsider the existing identity constructions due to the changed conditions in the international system after the end of the Cold War era. In the period 1998-2002 they attempt to strengthen their productions of identity, which had started to emerge earlier in the 1990s.

A comparison between the securitising actors’ constructions demonstrates that there is a considerable difference in how the actors create, frame and reinforce the national identities. It seems that Germany continue to include ‘Europe’ in the understanding of national identity and have been trying to act only in ‘Europe’s name’ (Ash, in Waever 2000:269).

In Britain’s case, with the change of the government in 1997, when the Labour party came to power, some modifications in the production of the national identity were introduced. British political actors attempt to find a new place for the country in the international system, but still cannot choose between the EU and NATO. So far British securitising actors have not incorporated Europe in the national identity construction and continue to keep the traditional distance from it. It seems that deeply rooted British exceptionalism is still very strongly influencing the identification of threats.

Like Britain, Sweden has also undergone a change in the identity production during the post-Cold War era. Swedish securitising actors have notably changed the discursive practices, shifting from contrasting Sweden to Europe to presenting Europe in a positive way, portraying engagement in European integration initiatives as the best way to manage post-Cold War risks. Furthermore, Sweden is actively engaging in the Baltic Sea region construction. Swedish securitising actors attempts to promote the cooperation in the Baltic Sea region is corresponding to their wish of being a leader of a region. As Neumann notices, ‘in Sweden region-building activity has centred on Sweden as a ‘natural’ core, with the Nordic region as an inner circle and a wider Baltic cooperation as an outer circle. In this way, Sweden has found a formula for transforming the strategy for regional domination to fit the new circumstances of the post-Cold War era’ (Neumann 1999:137). However, Swedish securitising actors are still attached to Sweden’s image as an active participant on the international stage and do not want to abandon the principle of neutrality, which, however, is
undergoing some essential changes.

Lithuania has faced different challenges in the post-Cold War era. After the restoration of independence the country had to become a subject in the international arena and had to develop a distinct international profile. Lithuanian securitising actors have been trying to create the distinct national identity, relating its political path with that of Europe. Thus, the main concern for Lithuanian securitising actors have been an attempt to overcome the image as a Soviet country and to argue for country’s ‘natural’ place in Europe. Securitising moves have also taken place in the context of ‘return to Europe’. Lithuanian securitising actors securitise the Baltic Sea region, though for different reasons than Swedish actors do. Securitisation of the Baltic Sea region provides Lithuanian securitising actors with a possibility to create closer cooperation links with the Western European countries and, as a result, come closer to the ideological core of Europe\(^\text{24}\), which is concentrated around the current members of the EU.

The securitising actors of all four countries portray the liberal values such as democracy, liberty, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law as to be safeguarded and promoted. These values are constitutive elements in the production of the countries’ identities, but are having different functions in the actors’ statements. In German case, the emphasis on liberal values can be seen as a negation of the country’s past (dictatorship and militarism), which helps to reinforce the post-Second World War identity. The emphasis of liberal values in British securitising actors’ statements is an expression of the attachment to the Anglo-Saxon ideology. Presenting these values as to be safeguarded and promoted, British political actors have a possibility to reinforce Britain’s image as a global and influential world power. Swedish securitising actors assume that the promotion of liberal values help to increase international cooperation and opens new possibilities for countering international threats. Enclosing solidarity to other liberal values Swedish securitising actors can reinforce a Swedish image of an internationally active country. For Lithuanian securitising actors emphasis on liberal values is of particular importance. Employing the same discursive strategies as Western European countries’ political actors, Lithuanian securitising actors can show that their country has the same set of values as the Western countries and is guided by them. With this move Lithuanian securitising actors want to show that the country has always had European values and hope to overcome a distinction from the Western countries, which was created during the more than fifty years of the Soviet occupation.

\(^{24}\) More on the ideological core on Europe look at Waever (2000).
Furthermore, such an argumentation from Lithuanian political actors’ side is necessary, because they have to adapt to the EU language if they want to be a member of the Union. Showing that the country has the same values and is actively promoting them turns out to be one of the best ways of achieving the membership. Hence, it can be said that liberal values help to reinforce the existing national identities and/or create a sense of belonging to the Western world.

Quite striking is the result that, in spite of different construction of national identities and, thus, different national interests, conditioned by these identities, all the countries identify the cessation of Eastern enlargement as one of the main threat to the countries’ and/or European security. It might be that those IR scholars, who argue that Europe has a socialising effect on the construction of national identities and understanding of threats may be right. Nevertheless, the securitising actors employ different discursive strategies in the presentation of the failure of Eastern enlargement as an existential threat. These differences are clear indications of how distinct productions of national identities influence the discursive strategies helping to reinforce these identities. German argumentation for the Eastern enlargement is closely related to the idea of ‘German in Europe and for Europe’. German securitising actors emphasise that Germany’s future lies in closely integrated Europe and only wider and deeper European integration can guarantee long-term security and peace in Europe. In this context German securitising actors are portraying the failure of the EU enlargement eastwards as one of the main existential threats to Germany/Europe. On the other hand, British securitising actors employ a different discursive strategy in framing this threat. ‘Enlightened self-interest’ and pragmatism are the cornerstones in arguing for the Eastern enlargement. This fact shows that Britain is still attached to the classical Anglo-Saxon notion of external sovereignty and continues the tradition of keeping a distance to Europe. The reinforcement of the existing identity can be identified in Sweden’s case as well. Like British political actors, Swedish securitising actors securitise the Eastern enlargement of the EU, without having included Europe in the understanding of the national identity. It seems that Swedish political actors want to strengthen their country’s position as an influential country in the Baltic Sea region by advocating the accession of the Baltic States to the EU. Furthermore, the same move reinforce Sweden’s image as a high-moral, sympathetic and encouraging country. In contrast, Lithuanian securitising actors, arguing for Eastern enlargement are in a different position. Integration to Europe through the enlargement of the EU has by Lithuanian securitising actors been seen as a possibility to survive in an unpredictable international environment. Being in the negotiation process for the country’s membership in the EU, Lithuanian securitising actors
have had to choose different discursive strategies in presenting the issue as an existential threat. They attempt to show that there can be no security in the EU/Europe if Lithuania is not there. Furthermore, the actors put a lot of efforts in showing that Lithuania has much to give in the process of increasing European security.

Hence, the above illustrations show that even though the narratives of national identities differ, resulting in different national interests, some commonality in the production of existential threats may indeed exist. It can be that at the intersection of such commonalities, the collective European identity can be formed.

Another common position among the countries is the securitisation of the instability and unpredictability in Russia. Importantly, all the countries moved from the position of presenting Russia as a danger to the identification of instability in Russia as an existential threat. All countries see democracy and multilateral cooperation as the best ways of countering this threat. This discursive practice is of particular importance in Lithuania’s case since Lithuanian securitising actors exhibit a remarkable shift in the construction of the issue. The first years after the restoration of Lithuania’s independence Russia was portrayed as the main direct threat to Lithuania’s security. However, in recent years this threat first started to dissolve and, later on, has been replaced. Now Lithuanian securitising actors have adapted their language to the Western official language and frame the threat in the same discursive pattern as Germany and Sweden do. It seems that this shift can be a result of the international socialisation process as well. Adjusting to the changed conditions in the international area and interacting with the Western countries, Lithuanian securitising actors have altered their discursive strategies. On the other hand, it is not only Lithuania that is interacting with the Western European countries. These other countries are in the continuous interaction process as well. It may be that the presentation of the same issue as an existential threat is an influence of the European level discourse, which has an impact on the national productions of identity.

The same can be said about the construction of so called ‘new threats’, that is threats that do not have clear geographical boundaries. To this category belong such threats as terrorism, international migration, organised crime, trafficking and environmental problems. It seems that the importance of these dangers is increasing with the widening understanding of security in these countries. The best illustration is probably once again Lithuania. When it managed to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial boundaries of the country (traditional ‘hard’ security
dimension’s issues), the ‘new threats’ started to be securitised more often. However, it seems that the international socialisation process is influencing this dimension as well. Thus, the production of threats is a complex process, where many factors can be influencing the process.

Besides, the frequency of the argumentation on the ‘new threats’ has increased considerably after September 11. Against this background the securitising actors concentrate on the issues of indivisibility and interdependence of security. At the same time this context provides the actors with a possibility of reinforcing the liberal values. It is worth noticing that British securitising actors expose an exceptional focus on this dimension. It seems that they attempt to reinforce the special relationship with the US, which in the recent years has become less special. As demonstrated, different construction of national identities and thus different national interest is not an obstacle of finding common areas and issues of cooperation. However, it should not be forgotten that, as it seems now, discourse on terrorism is making Islamic fundamentalism to a new ‘Other’. This new ‘Other’ is an ‘Other’ for all Western countries and can help to create a common ‘we-feeling’ and, thus, a collective identity between them. However, at the present situation it is too early to say, which shape this particular practice will get in the future.

So far the discussion has been focussed on the common points in the securitising actors’ speeches. However, there are some areas, where the countries’ positions go distinct ways. One of the areas that exhibit the greatest diversity in the securitising actors’ statements is the ‘soft’ security *vice-versus* the ‘hard’ security dimension. Here once again it can be identified how the peculiarities in the national identities’ production influence discursive practices and lead to the different positions on the issue. This dimension is the most controversial in the actors’ statements, but at the same time it can be that the attitude of acceptability of military means can best reflect the core elements of the national identities. Germany’s national identity is constructed distinguishing the country from its own military past. In that sense it is understandable why German securitising actors want to maintain the image of Germany as a civilian power and focus on the ‘soft’ security dimension. However, this position is undergoing some fundamental changes. Military instruments are no longer excluded from the possible means and it might gain its position in the future. On the other hand, Britain has had an image as a strong military power for a long time. Thus, British securitising actors continue to emphasise the importance of military means and see the military dimension as a way of gaining influence on Europe and at the same time as remaining attractive to the US. In
contrast, one of Sweden’s national identity cornerstones has been the concept of neutrality. As Hallenberg notices, the attachment to this dimension ‘is still maintained in the sense that Swedish actors remain peaceful and willing to cooperate, but ‘unalterably non-aligned’ (Hallenberg 2000:23). Swedish securitising actors have shifted ‘active neutrality’ concept of the Cold War period to the concept of ‘non-alignment’ in the post-Cold War era. Emphasising the crisis management dimension in the European level, Swedish securitising actors hope that the principle of neutrality can be maintained. Finally, the Lithuanian securitising actors’ statements are still very strongly influenced by the historical experience. According to Archer and Jones, ‘the overriding understanding of security is that of ‘hard’ military guarantees’ (Archer and Jones 1999:171). The securitising actors of Lithuania emphasise that they can only achieve security in cooperation with the Baltic, Nordic and Western countries. In this context the ‘soft’ security threats are framed. It seems that this kind of language was developed in the interaction process with the Nordic states, which already during the Cold War developed concepts of ‘comprehensive’ and ‘civic’ security (Archer and Jones 1999).

Hence, as illustrated above, the distinct production of national identities lead to different aspects to be emphasised. There are both similarities and differences in the securitising moves of the securitising actors. Similarities can be a common ground, which can help to develop a collective identity. Differences show very clearly the peculiarities in the constructions of the national identities. It seems that differences do not create conflicts as long as there is enough space for the diverse practices.

To conclude, there are indications that the studied states have different narratives for their national identities and a collective European identity. To discuss the interaction among the countries and a possibility of developing a collective European identity is the purpose of the following chapter of the paper.
CHAPTER IV DISCUSSION: A COLLECTIVE EUROPEAN IDENTITY?

The analysis of German, British, Swedish and Lithuanian securitising actors’ official speeches indicates that the national identities of these countries have been reconstructed in some way or another. At the same time security has been reframed as well. Moreover, the analysis suggest that these countries do not see each other as exposing direct threats, have shared norms and are actively cooperating. Wendt argues that this change is a result of the international socialisation process (Wendt 1999). One of the socialisation mechanisms is imitation. It seems that Lithuanian securitising actors have articulated a large part of Lithuania’s identity, using this mechanism. Lithuanians see the Western European countries as ‘successful’ and want to gain a membership of the collective identity that they see as existing in the West. For this reason, Lithuanian securitising actors tend to adopt the institutional and ideological attributes of Western countries (Wendt 1999). Furthermore, in a process of searching for a distinct identity and trying to integrate with the Western institutions Lithuanian securitising actors have also adapted their language to the language of the West (see section 3.5. of chapter III). It can be argued that the Western European states socialise Lithuania (and other post-Soviet states one might add) through the EU. Of particular importance are the Nordic countries that, in the words of Archer and Jones (1999), were tutors and willing partners for cooperation. In the interaction process, the Nordic countries have exported some of their concepts to Lithuania.

On the other hand, German, British and Swedish securitising actors do not use an imitation mechanism, but rather engage in a social learning process. Through interaction states learn particular ways of behaviour and can reframe the existing identities. The analysis of the securitising actors’ statements indicates that states interacting with each other have reconstructed their identities so that they no longer see each other as enemies.

Furthermore, cooperating states do not only change their identities, but can also form a collective identity (Wendt 1999:317), which create collective interests and shared norms. Wendt may be right that four decades of European cooperation have reconstituted identities and interests, creating a collective European identity with new norms and commitments (Wendt 1992). And it is this collective European identity that Lithuania perceives as ‘successful’ and wants to take part of.
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that European states are involved in ‘an intricate web of institutions and networks’ (Aggestam 2000:108), which influences production of identities. States’ national identities are not constructed independently of the European level, but this level also shape and is shaped by states’ understandings. As Wendt argues, ‘the process of creating institutions is one of internalising new understandings of self and other’ (Wendt 1992:417), through which shared commitments to social norms and positive interdependence can develop. Thus, in an ongoing socialisation through interactions in European institutions some kind of a new language is created, affecting all countries. This aspect was shortly touched in the previous section. All four countries tend to identify the same risks and present them as existential threats as, for example, the cessation of Eastern enlargement, the instability in Russia and the increasing danger of ‘new threats’.

Nevertheless, the comparison of the securitising actors’ speeches shows that there exist different narratives of the national identities and because of these differences diverse discursive strategies are being employed in the securitisation process. However, these different constructions do not hinder a cooperation and understanding of interests as common. It may be that these common points can be a link, connecting different countries and preparing a ground for the development of a collective European identity. All of the analysed countries have already incorporated liberal values into their production of national identities and identify positively with each other. However, this identification can be best described only as ‘concentric circles’ of identification, ‘in which the nature and effects of collective identity vary from case to case’ (Wendt 1999:338). It seems that the analysed countries do have varying degrees of such identification, depending on particular characteristics of identities and by them conditioned interests.

Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the securitising actors speak in different narratives about a collective European identity. States maintain the differences in the production of national identities, which has an impact on the understanding of the finality of European integration and a collective European identity.

As demonstrated in the analysis, Britain is still strongly attached to the idea of its exceptionalism. This makes it difficult for British actors to solve the dilemma of participation in the EU activities. As any move to federalist Europe is seen as a threat to national identity and sovereignty, British securitising actors continue to reject federalist ideas and support a project of intergovernmental Europe. Even as British securitising actors’ political and
economic orientations come closer to those of continental Europe, they maintain the broadly liberal, Atlanticist, and internationalist views. Like the British actors, Swedish securitising actors support the idea of the intergovernmental Europe. They have not internalised the commitment to European integration and seek to preserve their individuality. Swedish securitising actors are willing to cooperate in a great deal of areas, but the continuing attachment to some traditional elements of identity does not allow full integration in Europe. In contrast, German identity has for a long time incorporated ‘Europe’. German securitising actors continue to be ‘good Europeans’ and see European integration as the best way of ensuring long-term peace in Europe. It seems that the different attachment to ‘Europe’ depends on how ‘Europe’ corresponds to the core elements of deeply embedded national identity constructions.

To conclude, there may exist some common ground for a collective European identity formation. An ongoing socialisation process on the European level influences the production of national identities and creates a positive identification of each other, increasing a sense of common interests. The incorporation of the liberal values in every analysed country’s national identity is a considerable facilitating foundation for a strengthening of a collective European identity.

However, this convergence should not be exaggerated. There is a considerable difference in how the securitising actors of different countries ‘tell a story’ of identity. To use Marcussen et al phrase, the European nation state identities come ‘in distinct national colours’ (Marcussen et al 2001:118). Germany, for example, integrated ideas about Europe, but Sweden and Britain are still very much attached to the ideas of sovereignty. Hence, the best that can be expected is that countries, identifying themselves in some degree with a collective European identity, will strengthen this identification in an ongoing socialisation process and will reconstruct the existing identities so that ‘concentric circles’ of identification will come closer to the core of a collective European identity.
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS

This chapter summarises the main findings of the paper and evaluates the applicability of the chosen theoretical approaches.

The purpose of the study has been to investigate contemporary ideas of European identity through an analysis of the discourse on security, giving a special emphasis to the identity production/reproduction phase and a collective European identity formation process.

The findings of the study indicate that the combination of the Copenhagen school’s securitisation approach and constructivist understanding of identity give a fruitful way of analysing states’ identities. Looking at the identity through the construction of threats provided researcher with a possibility of understanding the process of identity production and reinforcement.

Moreover, following the Copenhagen’s school’s approach the securitising actors had a crucial role in defining existential threats and helping the researcher to avoid possible bias by deciding what is considered to be a security issue. Furthermore, employing Wendt’s perspective was possible to take a closer look into international socialisation process and give an account on collective identity formation process.

Besides, it was confirmed that identities are always relational and exist within a ‘specific, socially constructed world’ (Berger, in Wendt 1992:398). Security is intimately related to identity concept. Identity is an ongoing process within which actors continuously produce and reproduce conceptions of threats. The construction of threats involves an identification of ‘Other’ and ‘self’ against which the understanding of security is being articulated and identity is being reproduced. Thus, identity has to be seen in relation to other identities, because it is constructed in a complex interaction with the ‘Other’ and other “we’s”.

The main conclusion implies that there exist different narratives of national identities. Due to this variety diverse discursive strategies are employed in the securitisation process. However, there are some indications that there may exist a common ground for a collective European identity formation. One of the main commonalities is the employment of the same discursive strategies of all four countries on the issue of liberal values. Furthermore, it seems that an
ongoing socialisation process at the European level influences national identity constructions and creates positive identifications of each other.

However, there can be identified only ‘concentric circles’ of identification. There is a considerable difference in how the securitising actors ‘tell a story’ of identity, which influences the understanding of a collective European identity and the finality of the European integration project.
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APPENDIX –THE EMPIRICAL MATERIAL

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